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ARTICLE
IN DEFENSE OF THE DEBT LIMIT STATUTE
ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR*
The debt limit statute is a critical feature of the federal budget process
and prompts frequent legislation to increase the government's borrowing au-
thority. In this Article, Professor Anita S. Krishnakumar examines the history
of the debt limit statute as well as its function in the fiscal constitution. The
Article deconstructs several popular criticisms of the debt limit statute, argu-
ing that the criticisms exaggerate and that the statute in fact serves two im-
portant roles: first, the statute is the last remnant of congressional control and
accountability over the national debt; second, it acts as an important institu-
tional check on party and interest group politics. The Article ends by suggesting
several reforms to the existing debt statute framework, aimed at increasing
congressional accountability for the debt consequences of federal spending
and taxing choices, as well as at curbing some of the dangers associated with
the current framework.
The federal Constitution unequivocally vests power over fiscal mat-
ters in the hands of Congress.' But the Constitution provides no specific
guidance as to how the nation's fiscal policymaking should be conducted.
Accordingly, Congress has shaped its own implicit "fiscal constitution" of
statutes, internal rules, and legislative and administrative procedures that
govern the fiscal policymaking process.' One key feature of this fiscal consti-
tution is the debt limit statute, originally passed as part of the Second Lib-
erty Bond Act of 1917. 3 Prior to the statute's passage, Congress, pursuant
to its constitutional power "to borrow Money on the credit of the United
* Visiting Professor of Law, Touro College of Law. J.D., Yale Law School, 1999; A.B.,
Stanford University, 1996. This Article is dedicated in loving memory to my father, C. K.
Krishnakumar, an intellectual whose interest in the politics and government of his adopted
nation inspired, and continues to inspire, my study of the legislative process: This one is for
you, Dad; I think you would have liked it. I wish also to thank Michael Abramowicz and Doug
Lichtman for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Julie Becker, Laura Ahn McIntosh,
and Nelson Tebbe for their support.
' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives ...."); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-2, 5 ("The Congress shall have Power
to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ... To borrow Money on the credit
of the United States ... To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin
....."); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Re-
ceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."); see.
also THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
2 See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 595, 597 (1988).
3 Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2000)).
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States, 4 approved each individual issuance of debt made on the nation's
behalf.5 The debt limit statute delegates some of this borrowing power to
the Secretary of the Treasury, granting the Secretary standing authority to
issue debt without individual congressional approval, up to a specified
limit.6 The statute is an enduring element of the congressional budget proc-
ess and the frequent subject of legislation, as perennial deficits repeatedly
cause the Treasury to hit the prescribed limit and thereby necessitate leg-
islative action to increase the Treasury's authority to borrow.
Yet the dynamics of the debt limit statute in the federal budget and
fiscal policymaking process have been virtually unstudied by legal schol-
ars. This is despite the fact that the size of the national debt has become one
of the key political issues of our time,7 and despite increasing scholarly at-
tention to the legislative process in general8 and congressional budgeting in
particular. 9
This Article examines the function of debt and the debt limit statute
in the fiscal constitution. It argues that the debt limit statute serves two
important roles with respect to legislative deliberation over fiscal matters.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
5 See, e.g., PHILIP D. WINTERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. IB93054, THE DEBT LIMIT
(2001), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/economics/econ-55.cfm.
6 See Second Liberty Bond Act, 40 Stat. at 288 ("[Tlhe Secretary of the Treasury, with
the approval of the President, is hereby authorized to borrow, from time to time, on the
credit of the United States . . . not exceeding in the aggregate $7,538,945,460.").
7 See, e.g., Jeannine Aversa, Growing U.S. Debt Will Soon Hit Limit / Treasury Urges
Congress To Raise Borrowing Ability Beyond $6.4 Trillion, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 6, 2003, at
3 (discussing size of national debt and politics surrounding need to raise the debt limit);
John M. Berry, Treasury Issues Warning On Debt; Congress Asked To Raise Ceiling, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 2003, at El (discussing political debate over size of national debt and wis-
dom of raising taxes while debt continues to expand); David S. Broder, Our Children Will
Pay For Our Free Lunch; Federal Debt, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 18, 2004, at 21 (discussing
projection that federal debt will increase by $5 trillion in the next ten years and criticizing
Congress's fiscal irresponsibility); Federal Deficit; Bush Blindly Spends As Burgeoning
Debt Puts Country's Fiscal Future In Jeopardy, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 19, 2004, avail-
able at 2004 WL 90643892 (lamenting the growth and size of the national debt).
I See, e.g.. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game,
80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528-56 (1992) (using positive political theory models to conceptualize
lawmaking dynamics between the House, Senate, and the President); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond
Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax
Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 passim (1990) (examining passage of 1981
and 1986 tax legislation as case studies from which to extrapolate and understand how and
why Congress legislates); Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About
Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 427-47, 456-77 (2001) (discussing congressional
uses of internal structural rules to facilitate the enactment of otherwise controversial legis-
lation in 2001, including a $1.3 trillion tax cut, fast-track trade legislation, and disapproval
of an OSHA ergonomics rule).
I See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year
1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 390; Elizabeth Garrett, The Congres-
sional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-In-Government, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 702,
715-17 (2000); Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Require-
ments in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998); Charles Tiefer, Budg-
etized Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget
Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411 (1996).
In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute
First, the statute is the last remnant of congressional control or account-
ability over the national debt-and the primary vehicle through which Con-
gress fulfills its constitutional obligations under Article I, § 8 to oversee
the borrowing" and payment" of the public debt. Second, the debt limit
statute encourages legislators to consider the interests of the general pub-
lic and future generations, rather than those of special interests, and thus acts
as an important institutional check on party and interest group politics.
As this Article details, the general budget process is party- and inter-
est-group dominated, and involves numerous competing concerns and ag-
gregate figures, among which the annual deficit (borrowing) figure and the
status of the national debt are only one of many concerns. Within this
framework, debt limit increase bills provide an independent and focused
opportunity for Congress to step back and consider the consequences of
its deficit-spending decisions, to evaluate its fiscal policies, and even to
implement fiscal reform if it decides that it has been borrowing too much
too fast.
Such congressional accountability and periodic fiscal reform concern-
ing national borrowing and the debt are crucial features of the fiscal con-
stitution because although the United States is at this time capable of
servicing its enormous national debt, recent trends towards inefficient
and excessive borrowing portend future economic difficulties if left un-
checked. Specifically, whereas the United States once borrowed only oc-
casionally, in order to finance emergencies or its own expansion-i.e., to
fund wars, pull itself out of economic depression, or invest in its own infra-
structure"2-in the last several decades it has been borrowing on a consis-
tent annual basis simply to pay the overall cost of programs authorized
by Congress and the President. Thus, the last thirty years have seen sus-
tained growth not only in the size of the national debt, but in its propor-
tion relative to the Gross National Product (GNP) and the Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP). 3 As the proportion of debt to GNP/GDP has increased,
10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To borrow
Money on the credit of the United States .... ").
" See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving Congress power "to pay the Debts ... of the
United States").
12 See infra text accompanying notes 24, 27-28, 31-32, 34, 36-38, 40, 43-48, 81-82.
'3 In 1974, the national debt was equal to 34.24% of the United States' GNP/GDP; by
1994 it had risen to 68.91%; and in 2004, despite a period of budget surpluses in the late
1990s, it has climbed back up to 38.6% and is projected to reach 40% in 2007. See JOHN
STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES OF OUR
NATIONAL DEBT 210 (1997); see also On the Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Proposal: Hearings
Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 108th Cong. 27 (2004) (statement of Joshua B.
Bolten, Director of the Office of Mgmt. and Budget). This is the figure that economists care
about, even more than the absolute dollar amount of the debt, because the ratio shows how
much debt the nation can afford to carry, "just as the size of a mortgage that a family can
safely carry is determined by that family's income." GORDON, supra, at 197; see also On
the Economic Outlook and the Fed. Budget: Hearings Before the House Budget Comm.,
108th Cong. 24 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearings on the Economic Outlook] (statement of
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve) ("[T]he dangers begin to arise when the ratio of
2005)
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so too has the "debt servicing burden"-i.e., the percentage of the GDP
and government revenue spent servicing the national debt. 4 If this trend
continues, the American people will be forced to give up more and more of
their income in order to pay interest to their (in many cases overseas) 5
creditors, which in turn will lead to a persistent decline in the dollar's
international value and, therefore, purchasing power.' 6 Indeed, no less an
authority than Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has expressed
concern about future debt-to-GDP ratios and a consequent decline in liv-
ing standards if national borrowing continues on its current path. 7 The
debt limit statute plays a vital role in this context because although its
existence has not stopped the trend towards increased borrowing, it has
slowed that trend by acting as a catalyst for budget-reform and budget-
balance measures aimed at reducing national borrowing.
But despite its virtues, the debt limit statute is far from perfect. In-
deed, inside the Beltway it is much-maligned as an unnecessary anachro-
nism and, worse, as a dangerous "weapon" used by Congress to force the
President to make uncomfortable compromises on issues unrelated to the
debt."8 For this and other reasons, the Government Accountability Office
debt to GDP begins to rise").
14 See, e.g., 2004 Hearings on the Economic Outlook, supra note 13, at 27 (testimony
of Alan Greenspan) ("[T]he debt servicing burden obviously increases because the interest
payments have got to be paid out of the GDP, or out of the income which is generated by
the GDP"). Thus, in 1974, when the national debt was 34.24% of GDP, the percentage of
GDP spent repaying interest on the national debt was 1.5%, while in 1994, when the debt rose
to 68.91% of GDP, the proportion of GDP spent repaying interest on the debt rose to 2.9%,
and in 2004, with the debt at 38.6% of GDP, the percentage of GDP spent repaying interest
is estimated at 1.4% and is projected to reach 1.9% in 2007, when the percentage of debt
relative to GDP is expected rise to 40%. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, HIs-
TORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2005 48,
51-52 [hereinafter U.S. BUDGET FY 2005 HISTORICAL TABLES] (Table 3.1, Outlays By
Superfunction and Function: 1940-2009).
15 The share of the United States' national debt held by foreigners has risen steadily
over the last several decades, from 15% in the 1970s to 24% in the 1990s to 37% by 2003.
See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY/FEDERAL RESERVE BD., MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY
SECURITIES (2004), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2004-2015 130, available at http://
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4985/AppendixF.pdf (Table F-2); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND
BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2005 235, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf
(Table 15-6).
16 See ALFRED L. MALABRE, JR., BEYOND OUR MEANS: How AMERICA'S LONG YEARS OF
DEBT, DEFICITS AND RECKLESS BORROWING Now THREATEN TO OVERWHELM Us 5 (1987).
17 See 2004 Hearings on the Economic Outlook, supra note 13 (testimony of Alan
Greenspan) ("And all I can say about the current outlook is that the implicit growth rate
... creates debt-to-GDP levels which I would find of great concern .... [W]e could be in
a situation in the decades ahead in which rapid increases in the unified budget deficit set in
motion a dynamic in which large deficits result in ever-growing interest payments that
augment deficits in future years. The resulting rise in the federal debt could drain funds
away from private capital formation and thus over time slow the growth of living stan-
dards.").
'" See, e.g., Stephen Gettinger, The Budget: The Debt Ceiling "Hammer," 20 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1400, 1400 (May 23, 1995) (reporting the House of Representatives' purpose-
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(GAO) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), as well as many econo-
mists and budget commentators, have recommended its repeal.' 9 This Ar-
ticle evaluates the criticisms leveled against the statute and argues that they
are both exaggerated and misdirected. The statute is a necessary compo-
nent of Congress's power to borrow and has proved capable of serving as
a useful catalyst for budgetary reform aimed at debt reduction. Rather
than be repealed it should be amended, along with certain internal legis-
lative rules and budget procedures, to improve its ability to make Congress
more accountable for its borrowing decisions and for the size of the na-
tional debt.
In order to appreciate the enduring need for the debt limit statute, it
is necessary first to understand the evolution of Congress's borrowing and
debt repayment practices-i.e., the evolution of our national debt. Part I
of this Article briefly explores the nation's history of debt incurrence and
repayment, including adoption of the debt limit statute in 1917 and sub-
sequent modifications to its operation. Part II elucidates the constitu-
tional and institutional role played by the debt limit statute in the delib-
erative process concerning national borrowing and debt. Part III dis-
cusses criticisms leveled at the debt limit and demonstrates that they both
exaggerate actual experiences under the debt limit statute and fail to ap-
preciate the statute's beneficial effects. Part IV suggests procedural changes
to the statute-and House and Senate rules governing its implementation-
designed to facilitate greater congressional deliberation concerning the
national debt.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL DEBT AND THE DEBT LIMIT STATUTE
Since the inception of the United States in 1789, Congress has given
the Secretary of the Treasury substantial authority over monetary policy,
including the issuance and repayment of debt instruments.2" But while
Congress initially maintained significant control over the conditions un-
der which national debt could be incurred, over time it increasingly has
ful withholding of debt limit increase legislation in reserve as a "weapon" with which to
force President Clinton to accept legislation that he could otherwise freely veto).
"9 See, e.g., Increase in Federal Debt Limit: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On Fin.,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Bruce R. Bartlett, Senior Fellow, National Center for Policy
Analysis); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE
48-54 (1995); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A NEW APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC DEBT LEGIS-
LATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (1979); Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets,
Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 578-79 (1997) (arguing that debt limit is
dangerous and calling for reformation of the statute); see also Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a
Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What it is Supposed to Do (And No More),
106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1516-17 (1997) (discussing dangers of using debt ceiling increases as
the enforcement mechanism for a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution).
20 See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 13, at 24-28 (describing Secretary Alexander Hamil-
ton's role in shaping the terms under which the new United States government would re-
deem the debts of the old Articles of Confederation government).
2005]
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delegated even this authority to the Treasury Secretary. 2' Further, although
Congress and the Executive followed a careful fiscal policy of balanced
budgets and peacetime debt repayment for the first 150-odd years of the
nation's history, they have allowed serial deficits and continuing debt expan-
sion for the last sixty-plus years. The historical evolution of the United
States' debt can be broken down into roughly three periods: 1789-1917,
when debt was incurred exclusively to pay for wars and to sustain the
economy during a recession, but paid down immediately upon return to
peace and prosperity; 1917-1946, when Congress passed the debt limit
statute granting the Treasury standing borrowing authority, but continued
to manage debt incurrence and repayment in substantially the same man-
ner as before; and 1946 to the present, when changed attitudes towards
debt and the debt limit have produced sustained peacetime deficits and
virtually no debt reduction.
Section A of this Part describes Congress's approach to debt issu-
ance and payment prior to 1917. Section B examines the Second Liberty
Bond Act (the debt limit statute) and the manner in which it delegates
some of Congress's control over borrowing to the Treasury Secretary.
Section C explores the shift in how Congress and the nation have used
debt since the 1960s as well as the changing role of the debt limit statute
in fiscal policymaking over the past forty years.
As the following historical analysis reveals, the details and philoso-
phy of congressional management of the national debt have changed dra-
matically in the course of our nation's history. But significantly, even as our
national economy, debt incurrence, and repayment practices have devel-
oped, the debt limit statute has given Congress a forum for periodic as-
sessment, criticism, and reform of national borrowing policy, and has
forced Congress and the President to be publicly accountable for their
borrowing decisions.
A. National Borrowing and Debt Payment Before 1917
The federal government began in 1789 with a public debt of $78 mil-
lion, 2  inherited from the old national government and the governments of
several states.2 3 Most of this debt had been incurred in fighting the Revolu-
21 See discussion infra Part 1.B. I and text accompanying notes 122-124 and 128-130.
22 Adjusted for inflation, this is equivalent to approximately $1.6 billion in 2004. See
ROBERT C. SAHR, INFLATION CONVERSION FACTORS FOR YEARS 1665 TO ESTIMATED 2014,
at 5, at http://oregonstate.edu/dept/pol-sci/fac/sahr/sahr.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2004) (using
conversion factor of .049 for comparison of 1789 dollars to 2004 dollars; $78 million divided
by .049 equals $1.6 billion).
23 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-134, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY: ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 2002 DEBT ISSUANCE SUSPENSION PERIODS
2 (2002). Approximately $18 million came from the assumption of state bonds still in cir-
culation, and $60 million from the redemption of the old national debt. See GORDON, supra
note 13, at 28.
[Vol. 42
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tionary War. 24 From the first, Congress made it a national priority to pay
down the country's debt.25 In fact, it quickly passed a series of tariffs and
excise taxes and, by 1811, managed to cut the nation's debt down to
$48 million.216
Congress did not cause the nation to incur debt again until 1812, when
the still-fledgling United States once more went to war with England. 7
By the time the war ended, the national debt had risen to over $99 million.2 1
Once peace returned, the government again made it a priority to pay
down the debt,29 running significant surpluses in all but a few of the years
between 1816 and 1836.30
In 1836, on the heels of President Andrew Jackson's decision to close
down the National Bank, the nation experienced its first serious depres-
sion.3" The depression lasted until 1843 and caused the debt to rise to
$32 million.32 Once the depression ended, Congress and the President again
began paying down the debt, managing to reduce it to $15.5 million
within three years.3
3
24 Cf. GORDON, supra note 13, at 11, 24, 54.
25 See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138 (repealed) (making a provision for the
payment of the debt of the United States). Some eleven other acts were passed in the 1790s
directing the Treasury to use surpluses to pay down debt contracted during the Revolution-
ary War. See id. at note (a) (listing other acts); see also Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 32, 2
Stat. 167 (repealed) (making appropriations for the extinguishment of the public debt, to be
paid to the commissioners of a "sinking fund" established to repay the government's bond
issues); Act of Feb. 11, 1807, ch. 12, 2 Stat. 415 (making provisions for the redemption of
the whole public debt of the United States).26 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 48; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATIS-
TICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1118 (1976) [hereinafter His-
TORICAL STATISTICS TABLES] (Federal Debt Statistics Tables for 1836-1843). Adjusted for
inflation, that $48 million debt in 1811 is equivalent to $658 million in 2004. See SAHR,
supra note 22, at 6 (using conversion factor of .073 for comparison of 1811 dollars to 2004
dollars; $48 million divided by .073 equals $658 million).
27 See Act of Mar. 24, 1814, ch. 29, 3 Stat. 11l (repealed) (authorizing a loan for a sum
not exceeding $25 million); see also GORDON, supra note 13, at 47-48. In 2004 dollars,
that is the equivalent of authorizing the nation to borrow $255 million. See SAHR, supra
note 22, at 6 (using conversion factor of .098 for comparison of 1814 dollars to 2004 dol-
lars; $25 million divided by .098 equals $255 million).
28 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1118. Adjusted for inflation,
that is equivalent to approximately $1 billion in 2004 dollars. See SAHR, supra note 22, at
6 (using conversion factor of .098 for comparison of 1814 dollars to 2004 dollars; $99 million
divided by .098 equals $1 billion).
29 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 87, 2 Stat. 379 (repealed) (directing commissioners of
the sinking fund to use surpluses above a certain amount to purchase or redeem the public
debt); Act of Apr. 24, 1830, ch. 78, 4 Stat. 396 (authorizing Treasury Secretary to apply
sums greater than $10 million to the payment or purchase of the principal of the public debt).30 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 53, 207 (Federal Debt Statistics Table).
31 See id., at 62-64.
32 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1118 (Federal Debt Statistics Ta-
bles for 1836-1843). In inflation-adjusted dollars, this is equal to approximately $780 million
in 2004. See SAHR, supra note 22, at 6 (using conversion factor of .043 for comparison of
1846 dollars to 2004 dollars; $15.55 million divided by .043 equals $362 million).
33 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1118 (Federal Debt Statistics
Tables for 1846). This is equivalent to approximately $362 million in 2004 dollars. See
SAHR, supra note 22, at 6 (using conversion factor of .043 for comparison of 1846 dollars
2005]
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The Mexican War in 1847 led Congress to create its first "automatic"
appropriation-authorizing the Treasury to pay interest and principal on
the debt as it became due, without obtaining specific congressional ap-
proval.3 4 Within a few years of the war's end, Congress again began run-
ning surpluses and paying down the debt.35
In the 1860s, the Civil War erupted, taking military outlays and the
national debt to unprecedented heights.36 To help fund the war, Congress
authorized Treasury Secretary Jay Cooke to issue debt in the form of "five-
forty" bonds, so-named because they could not be redeemed before five
years, or after forty.37 Cooke employed newspaper advertising to persuade a
vast number of average citizens to purchase war bonds, thereby inventing
the modern bond drive.38 Congress also imposed an array of new war-
time taxes-including excise taxes, stamp taxes, transportation taxes, adver-
tising taxes, and a federal tax on income-and created a Bureau of Inter-
nal Revenue to supervise the assessment and collection of these taxes.39
By the end of the Civil War, the national debt had risen over forty-fold,
from a pre-war level of approximately $58.5 million, to $2.75 billion in
1866, the first year of peace. 4° But once peace returned, Congress again
ran surpluses and pared down the debt.4 1 In fact, from 1866 to 1893, Con-
gress ran eighteen straight surpluses.
4 2
In 1917, American involvement in World War I again raised govern-
ment expenditures to new levels. With former Treasury Secretary Jay
Cooke's Civil War bond drive as a model, the Treasury began a series of
to 2004 dollars; $15.55 million divided by .043 equals $362 million).
34 See Act of Feb. 9, 1847, ch. 7, 9 Stat. 123 (providing for the payment of any interest
on the public debt); see also GORDON, supra note 13, at 65.
31 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 66.36 See id. at 68. When the war began in April 1860, federal spending for all depart-
ments totaled only $172,000 a day, paid for almost entirely by tariff and land sale revenue;
within three months, war spending alone was costing $1 million a day. See id. In inflation-
adjusted 2004 dollars, that is the equivalent of going from spending $3.7 million a day to
$21.3 million a day in just three months. See SAHR, supra note 22, at 7 (using conversion
factor of .047 for comparison of 1860 dollars to 2004 dollars; $172,000 divided by .047
equals $3.7 million and $1 million divided by .047 equals $21.3 million).
37 See Act of Mar. 3, 1864, ch. 27, 13 Stat. 13 (repealed 1864) (supplementing the act
entitled "An Act to provide Ways and Means for the Support of the Government"). In the
meantime, the bonds paid six percent interest, in gold. See id.
38 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 78.
39 See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (providing internal revenue to support
the government and to pay interest on the public debt).
4 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1118. In inflation-adjusted
2004 dollars, this is the equivalent of an increase in the national debt from $1.2 billion to
$31 billion. See SAHR, supra note 22, at 7 (using conversion factor of .047 for comparison
of 1859 dollars to 2004 dollars; $58.5 million divided by .047 equals $1.2 billion; and a
conversion factor of .089 for comparison of 1866 dollars to 2004 dollars; $2.75 billion divided
by .089 equals $31 billion).
11 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1118 (post-1866).
42 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1118. The official total debt
figures printed in these tables appear to rise in small amounts during some years in this
period, but that is because of accounting technicalities. See id.
[Vol. 42
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World War I bond drives to raise revenue for military outlays. 43 The gov-
ernment also sharply increased federal income taxes to assist with war-time
funding, dropping the exemption level to encompass much of the middle
class as well as ratcheting up the marginal rates. 4" As a result of the war,
the national debt increased by a factor of twenty, leaping from $1.2 bil-
lion in 19164" to a high of $25.48 billion in 1919,46 and federal revenues
soared from $761 million in 191641 to $5.1 billion in 1919.48
Thus, from 1789 to 1917, Congress's approach to debt was conserva-
tive. Although the government was unafraid to incur debt, it preferred to
meet its expenses with tariff and tax revenue, and borrowed only when
faced with the exigent circumstances of war or economic recession. More-
over, once these exigencies abated, Congress immediately began to pay
down and reduce the debt it had incurred.
B. The Second Libetty Bond Act of 1917 and Its Initial Use
1. Provisions of the Original Debt Limit Statute
Prior to World War I, Congress separately authorized each issuance
of bonds, notes or other securities made to finance government activi-
ties. 49 This included determining the interest rate and term for the debt
instruments to be used.5 0 During the war, however, Congress passed the
41 See, e.g., First Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-3, 40 Stat. 35 (1917) (authorizing the
issue of $2 billion in war bonds "to meet expenditures for the national security and defense,
and, for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of the war, to extend credit to foreign
governments, and for other purposes"); see also GORDON, supra note 13, at 103.
44 See ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY, 58-78
(2004); see also GORDON, supra note 13, at 104.
41 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1117. Adjusted for inflation,
this translates to approximately $20.65 billion in 2004. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS' CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.
htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004) [hereinafter CPI] (numbers calculated using average annual
index for 1913-2003, and average semi-annual index number for the first half of 2004,
with the following formula (old dollar value X (2004 first semi-annual index/old year avg.
index)), so that for 1916, formula was (($1.2 billion) X (2004 semi-annual avg. index of
187.6/1916 avg. index of 10.9))).
"See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES supra note 26, at 1117. This is the equivalent of
approximately $276.3 billion 2004 dollars. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price
index of 17.3 for 1919).
41 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES supra note 26, at 1117. This is the equivalent of
approximately $1.31 billion 2004 dollars. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price
index of 10.9 for 1916).
41 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1106 (showing Federal Debt
Statistics Tables for 1916-1919). This is equivalent to $55.3 billion in 2004. See CPI, su-
pra note 45 (using index of 17.3 for 1919).
49 See, e.g., supra notes 25 and 29; see also WINTERS, supra note 5; 7 CONG. AND THE
NATION: 1985-1988 42-43 (Colleen McGuiness ed., 1989).
50 See, e.g., Act of July 26, 1886, ch. 265, 14 Stat. 255 (specifying that bonds author-
ized under a previous act, for the purpose of aiding in railroad and telegraph line construc-
tion from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, "may be issued in denominations greater
than one thousand dollars"); Act of Mar. 31, 1848, ch. 26, 9 Stat. 217 (authorizing borrow-
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Liberty Bond Acts5 to facilitate fulfillment of the government's rapidly
increasing financing needs. The Second Liberty Bond Act, passed in Sep-
tember 1917,52 is widely known as the basis for the modem debt limit stat-
ute.53 The first section of the Act provides that:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, is hereby authorized to borrow, from time to time, on the
credit of the United States for the purposes of this Act, and to
meet expenditures authorized for the national security and de-
fense and other public purposes authorized by law, not exceed-
ing in the aggregate $7,538,945,460 and to issue therefore bonds
of the United States ....
The bonds herein authorized shall be in such form or forms and
denomination or denominations and subject to such terms and con-
ditions of issue, conversion, redemption, maturities, payment, -and
rate or rates of interest, not exceeding four per centum per an-
num, and time or times of payment of interest, as the Secretary of
the Treasury from time to time at or before the issue thereof
may prescribe. 54
The Act thus gave the Secretary of the Treasury standing authority to borrow
as and when he deemed appropriate (i.e., "from time to time,") to meet
national expenses, up to a maximum limit of $7.538 billion.55 The Act
also expanded the Secretary's discretion over the form, denomination, and
terms and conditions of the bonds to be issued, although Congress refused to
relinquish complete control over the rates of interest to be paid.56
In addition to the bonds authorized in section 1, the Act granted the
Treasury Secretary general authority to borrow, from time to time, "such
sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary" in the form of (1) certifi-
cates of indebtedness, up to an aggregate limit of $4 billion;57 and (2) war-
ing of up to $16 million, at a six percent rate of interest, reimbursable after twenty years).
"' First Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-3, 40 Stat. 35 (1917); Second Liberty Bond
Act, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (1917); Third Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-120,
40 Stat. 502 (1918); Fourth Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-192, 40 Stat. 844 (1918);
Victory Liberty Loan Act, Pub. L. No. 65-328 40 Stat. 1309 (1919).
12 See 40 Stat. at 288 (subtitled "An Act to authorize an additional issue of bonds to
meet expenditures for the national security and defense, and, for the purpose of assisting in
the prosecution of the war, to extend additional credit to foreign Governments, and for other
purposes").
51 See, e.g., WINTERS, supra note 5.
54 See § 1, 40 Stat. at 288.
11 This translates to approximately $110.48 billion in 2004. See CPI, supra note 45
(using consumer price index of 12.8 for 1917).
56 See § 3, 40 Stat. at 289-90.
17 See § 5, 40 Stat. at 290. This translates to $58.625 billion in 2004. See CPI, supra
note 45 (using consumer price index of 12.8 for 1917).
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savings certificates, up to a limit of $2 billion 8.5 Again, the Secretary was
given broad discretion over the offering terms for the certificates, such as
price, redemption conditions, and even the rate of interest5 9
Notably, the Act also authorized the Treasury Secretary, "for the pur-
pose of more effectually providing for the national security and defense
and prosecuting the war," to purchase on behalf of the United States the
obligations of foreign governments then engaged in war with the enemies
of the United States, and appropriated $4 billion for such purchases.60
This authority was to end upon termination of the war with Germany.6
Other provisions of the Act dealt in detail with the convertibility of
bonds, tax exemptions, the deposit of proceeds from the sale of bonds
and certificates, the postal service's obligation to assist in the advertising,
sale, and delivery of bonds, and restrictions on the further issue of bonds.6 2
Moreover, as a check on the additional authority given to the Treasury Sec-
retary, the Act required the Secretary to submit annual reports to Con-
gress detailing all expenditures made under it.63
The Third and Fourth Liberty Bond Acts, passed in 1918, amended the
Second Liberty Bond Act to increase the authorized limits on government
issuances of bonds, credits to allied governments, and certificates of in-
debtedness. 64 The Victory Liberty Loan Act, passed in 1919, further
amended the statute to authorize the government to issue up to $7 billion65
in Treasury notes, above and beyond the bonds, certificates, and credits
58See § 6, 40 Stat. at 291. This is the equivalent of approximately $29.31 billion in
2004 dollars. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index of 12.8 for 1917).59 See §§ 5, 6, 40 Stat. at 290-91. The only limitations the Act placed on the terms of
the war-savings certificates were that (1) no one person could be sold more than $100
worth of certificates at any one time; and (2) no one person could hold such certificates in
an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 at any one time. See id.6 4See id. § 2. Again, this is equivalent to approximately $58.625 billion dollars in
2004. See CPI, supra note 45 (using index of 12.8 for 1917).
61 See § 2, 40 Stat. at 288-89.62 See id. §§ 3, 4, 7-9, 11.
63 See id. § 10.
64 Specifically, the Third Liberty Bond Act increased the authorized issue of bonds
from $7 billion to $12 billion, the appropriation for purchases of allied governments' obli-
gations from $4 billion to $5.5 billion, and the limit for outstanding certificates of indebt-
edness from $4 billion to $8 billion. See Third Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-120, §§ 1,
2, 4, 40 Stat. 502, 503-04 (1918). In inflation-adjusted dollars, this is equivalent to raising
the authorized issue of bonds from $102.6 billion to $149.1 billion, the appropriation for
purchases of allied governments' obligations from $58.6 billion to $68.3 billion, and the limit
for outstanding certificates of indebtedness from $58.6 billion to $99.4 billion. See CPI,
supra note 45 (using index of 12.8 for 1917 and 15.1 for 1918). The Fourth Liberty Bond
Act further increased the limit on authorized issues of bonds to $20 billion and the limit on
appropriations for purchases of allied governments' obligations to $7 billion. See Fourth
Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-192, §§ 1, 2, 40 Stat. 844 (1918). Adjusting for inflation,
this is equivalent in 2004 dollars to an increase to $248.5 billion on authorized issues of
bonds and to $87 billion on the limit on appropriations for purchases of allied governments'
obligations. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index of 15.1 for 1918).
65 This is approximately equivalent to $75.9 billion in 2004. See CPI, supra note 45
(using consumer price index of 17.3 for 1919).
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previously authorized by the Second Liberty Bond Act and its amend-
ments. 66 As in the earlier Bond Acts, Congress in the Victory Liberty Loan
Act delegated discretion over the terms of the notes to the Treasury Sec-
retary.
67
Thus, although the original debt limit statute granted the Treasury
Secretary standing authority to borrow and eliminated congressional con-
trol over some of the more minute details of debt issuance, Congress con-
tinued to maintain a heavy hand in supervising the particulars of national
borrowing under this first iteration of the statute.
2. Debt Incurrence and Repayment from World War I to
World War ! (1920-1946)
Following World War I, Congress and the Treasury resumed the pre
debt limit pay-as-you-go-except-during-war-or-depression approach to fiscal
policy. To this end, Congress took two steps aimed at reducing its $25 bil-
lion post-war debt. The first was to continue the nation's long-standing
peacetime practice of controlling spending and using government sur-
pluses to pay down the national debt. 68 As post-war Secretary of the
Treasury Andrew Mellon later explained, "Since the war two guiding
principles have dominated the financial policy of the Government. One is
the balancing of the budget, and the other is the payment of the public
debt. Both are in line with the fundamental policy of the government
since its beginning."'69 The second step was the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921." The Budget and Accounting Act required sub-
mission of an annual budget from the executive branch, created the Bu-
reau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget), and es-
tablished the General Accounting Office.7' All of these changes were de-
signed to create cohesion in the national budget and to facilitate budget
balance.12 In all, the post-war government managed to cut federal spend-
ing by fifty percent between 1920 and 1927, and to reduce the national
debt from $24.3 billion to $16.9 billion by 1929.
73
66 See Victory Liberty Loan Act, Pub. L. No. 65-328, § 1, 40 Stat. 1309 (1919) (creat-
ing a new "Sec. 18. (a)" in the Second Liberty Bond Act).
67 See id.
68 See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 13, at 110.
69 ANDREW MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS 25 (Macmillan 1924).
70 See Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921).
71 See id. §§ 201,207, 301.
72 See AARON WILDAVSKY & NAOMI CAIDEN, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS 38-39 (4th ed. 2001).
73 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1114 (Federal Outlay Statis-
tics Table for 1789-1970); id. at 1117 (Federal Debt Statistics Table for 1791-1970). The
$24.3 billion in 1920 is the equivalent of $227.9 billion in 2004, and the $16.9 billion in
1929 is equivalent to $185.4 billion in 2004. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price
index of 20 for 1920 and 17.1 for 1929).
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With the onset of the Great Depression in 1930, this trend shifted
dramatically. As in earlier periods of depression, the collapse of the eco-
nomic markets caused government revenues to decline substantially, from
$4 billion in 1930 to less than $2 billion in 1932 and 1933.71 The decline
resulted in passive deficits, so-called because they derive from falling tax
receipts in difficult economic times, rather than from deliberate spending
increases.75 Instead of attempting to balance these passive deficits with tax
increases, which they feared would create even greater economic havoc,7 6
President Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress enacted an array
of New Deal programs designed to create jobs and provide federal relief
to the working class.77 As a result, federal government outlays increased
from $4.6 billion to $9.06 billion during the eight-year period from 1933
to 1940.8 During this same period, the national debt climbed from $22.5
billion to $43 billion.79 Shortly thereafter, in early 1941, Congress made
an important procedural change to the debt limit statute: It replaced the
different limits set for different types of debt instruments (i.e., bonds vs.
certificates of indebtedness vs. war-savings certificates vs. notes) with one
aggregate limit for all types of debt issued by the Treasury.80
The depression of the 1930s was followed almost immediately by
American involvement in the Second World War. The war years added
14 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1106 (providing Federal Gov-
ernment Administrative Budget Receipts Statistics Table for 1789-1939). Four billion in 1930
is the equivalent of $44.93 billion in 2004, and less than $2 billion in 1932-1933 translates
to less than $28 billion in 2004 ($27.39 billion using a 1932 index of 13.7, and $28.86 billion
using 1933 consumer price index of 13.0). See CPI, supra note 45.
71 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 122.
76 Experiences with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and other tax increases under the Hoover
Administration had backfired in just such a fashion. See GORDON, supra note 13, at 117-19.
77 These included programs creating Social Security, providing conditional agricultural
aid to farmers, and funding new federal agencies such as the National Labor Relations
Board. See Social Security Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935); Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat.
449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
78 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 123; HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26,
at 1117 (providing Federal Debt Statistics Table for 1791-1970). Adjusted for inflation and
measured in 2004 dollars, this is the equivalent of an increase from $66.38 billion to
$121.4 billion. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index of 13.0 for 1933 and
14.0 for 1940).
79 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1117 (providing Federal Debt
Statistics Table for 1791-1970). Adjusted for inflation and measured in 2004 dollars, this is
the equivalent of an increase in the national debt from $324.69 billion in 1933 to $576.2
billion in 1940. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index of 15.2 for 1931, 13.4 for
1934, and 13.7 for 1935).
80 See Public Debt Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-7, § 2, 55 Stat. 7 (1941) (amending sec-
tion 21 of the Second Liberty Bond Act to provide that "[t]he face amount of obligations
issued under the authority of this Act shall not exceed in the aggregate $65,000,000,000"
and terminating the specific authority granted in other sections of the Act with respect to
certificates of indebtedness, war savings certificates, and the retirement of defense obliga-
tions).
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$220 billion to the national debt, bringing the cumulative total to $269 bil-
lion in 1946.1' In response to the funding demands of the war, Congress in-
creased the debt limit set in the Second Liberty Bond Act (as amended)
several times8 2 and raised taxes on the middle class.83 By the time the war
ended, the United States government had run straight deficits for sixteen
years. 4
Despite this unprecedented string of deficits, congressional action under
the debt limit statute from World War I through World War II remained
substantially similar to its previous approach to national borrowing. Al-
though the absolute amount and duration of debt incurrence during this
period was staggering, such borrowing remained consistent with the old
consensus that debt could and should be incurred in times of war and
economic depression. In fact, the only deviation from prior norms was
the government's creation of new program spending in the midst of the
depression (although it was not new for outlays to increase during a de-
pression, such increases never before had been so steady and sharp,85 nor
had they been the result of deliberate government expansion of program
spending).
C. National Borrowing and the Debt Limit Statute Since World War II
The post-World War II era has been marked by three periods of shifting
priorities and politics regarding the national debt and the debt limit stat-
ute. From 1946 to 1960, the government slowly moved away from its
focus on balanced budgets and debt reduction as the "first object" of fed-
"I See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1117 (providing Federal Debt
Statistics Table for 1791-1970). This cumulative total is equivalent to approximately
$2.59 trillion in 2004 dollars. See CPI, supra note 45 (using 1946 consumer price index of
19.5).
82 See Public Debt Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-5 10, § 2, 56 Stat. 189 (1942) (increas-
ing limit to $125 billion); Public Debt Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-333, § 2, 58 Stat. 272
(1944) (increasing limit to $260 billion); Public Debt Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-28, § 2, 59
Stat. 47 (1945) (increasing limit to $300 billion). Adjusting for inflation, this amounts to
debt limits in 2004 dollars of $1.44 trillion in 1942, $2.77 trillion in 1944, and $3.13 trillion in
1945. See CPI, supra note 45 (using index of 16.3 for 1942, 17.6 for 1944, and 18.0 for
1945).
83 See BROWNLEE, supra note 44, at 112.
' See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1105 (showing Federal Fi-
nances Statistics Table for 1929-1970).
85 During the depression of the 1830s, for example, outlays rose from a range of
$17 million to $23 million from 1832 to 1835 to between $24 billion and $37 billion from
1836 to 1842. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1114-15 (Federal
Outlays Statistics Table for 1789-1970). Similarly, during what some historians have termed
the depression of the 1890s, see Gordon, supra note 13, at 90, outlays increased from a
range of $318 million to $383 million from 1890 to 1893 to between $352 million and
$605 million from 1894 to 1899. See id. Compare this with the depression of the 1930s, during
which outlays increased from a range of $3.1 billion to $4.6 billion from 1929 to 1933 to
between $6.5 billion and $9.06 billion from 1934 to 1940. See id.
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eral fiscal policy in a post-war period.16 In the 1960s and 1970s, Ameri-
can politicians embraced the philosophy of British economist John May-
nard Keynes,8 7 resulting in nearly uninterrupted deficits and debt expan-
sion, as well as in congressional use of the debt limit statute to criticize
executive fiscal policy. This trend continued and expanded in the 1980s
and 1990s, when votes to increase the debt limit began to be used by some
as vehicles for budget reforms aimed at debt reduction and by others as a
legislative weapon in congressional-executive battles over fiscal policy.
1. National Debt in the 1940s and 1950s
As with previous wars, the end of World War II brought back na-
tional surpluses,88 but now the government no longer was committed to
balancing the budget and paying down the debt. Increasingly influenced
by British economist John Maynard Keynes, American politicians had
begun to abandon their focus on debt reduction as the key to economic
prosperity. Keynes' macroeconomic model characterized government debt
as "borrowing from oneself'-with the nation's debits canceled out by its
citizens' credits-and justified deliberate peacetime deficits when govern-
ment spending was deemed necessary to ensure stable economic growth.8 9
Also contributing to the political shift away from absolute insistence on
balanced budgets and debt repayment were national experiences during
the Great Depression, when: (1) the Hoover Administration's efforts to
balance the budget by increasing tariffs and taxes only further destabi-
lized the economy9" and (2) an array of new government programs requir-
ing substantial peacetime federal spending took root.9
This is not to suggest that budget balance and debt reduction played
no role in post-World War II federal fiscal policy; in fact, the government
ran surpluses for four of the first six years following the war, and reduced
the debt in three of those years. 92 And in 1946, Congress inaugurated the
86 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 129.
1 7 CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 49, at 42; see also GORDON, supra note 13, at
129.
88 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1105 (providing Federal Fi-
nances Statistics Tables for 1929-1970) (showing an annual surplus in 1947 after sixteen
straight years of deficits).
89 See 7 CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 49, at 42; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN
& RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES
134-42 (1977) (providing a straightforward discussion of Keynes's economic philosophy
as applied to political governance regarding the national debt); GORDON, supra note 13, at
129-41.
90 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
"' See id.
92 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1105 (providing Federal Fi-
nances Statistics Tables for 1929-1970). The three post-war years in which the debt de-
creased were 1947, 1948, and 1951. See id. at 1118 (showing a decrease from $271 billion
in 1946 to $257 billion in 1947 and $252 billion in 1948, and a decrease from $257 billion
in 1950 to $255 billion in 1951).
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post-war period by decreasing, rather than increasing, the debt limit.93
Significantly, three of the government's post-war surpluses occurred dur-
ing years when the United States was involved in fighting the Korean War.94
In the eight years from 1953 to 1960, however, this trend began to shift,
as the government ran an almost equal number of deficits and surpluses
95
and Congress, in response to requests from Treasury and the President, en-
acted several increases to the statutory debt limit.9" During the 1950s,
Congress began passing a portion of these increases as "temporary" ex-
tensions that expire on a particular date, in the hope of limiting long-term
debt growth and encouraging the debt to shrink in the future. 97 Congres-
sional-executive interactions with respect to the debt limit remained, for
the most part, harmonious during this period, 9 although Congress did not
always increase the debt limit by as much as the President requested. 99
2. National Debt in the 1960s and 1970s
In the 1960s, the Keynesian economic philosophy that had begun to
influence American politicians in the 1940s and 1950s took firm root, and
came to dominate American fiscal policy as well as to provide political justi-
fication for continued federal spending on New Deal programs and spend-
93 See Public Debt Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-455, 60 Stat. 316 (1946). This amend-
ment lowered the limit from $300 billion to $275 billion. Id. In 2004 dollars, that is a de-
crease from $2.89 trillion to $2.65 trillion. See CPI, supra note 45 (using average con-
sumer price index of 19.5 for 1946).
94 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1105 (providing Federal Fi-
nances Statistics Table for 1929-1970).
91 See id. (demonstrating three surpluses, in 1956, 1957, and 1960 versus five deficits,
in 1953 to 1955, 1958, and 1959).
96See, e.g., Act of July 9, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-678, 70 Stat. 519; Act of June 30,
1955, Pub. L. No. 84-124, 69 Stat. 241; Act of Aug. 28, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-686, 68 Stat.
895; see also CONG. AND THE NATION: 1945-1964 394 (Thomas N. Schroth ed., 1965).
97 See WINTERS, supra note 5.
98 One interesting exception to this general inter-branch cooperation occurred in 1953,
when the Senate tabled a bill responding to the Treasury's request for an increase in the debt
ceiling, and then adjourned without further action. See CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note
96, at 394. Given Congress's failure to act, the U.S. Treasury eventually used $500 million of
its "free gold" supply to stay within the debt ceiling. See id.
99 In 1958, for example, although the President requested an increase of $10 billion in
the permanent debt ceiling, plus a $3 billion increase in the temporary limit for two years,
Congress authorized a permanent increase of only $8 billion, plus a $5 billion increase in
the temporary ceiling for one year. See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-912, 72 Stat.
1758 (1958); CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 96, at 394. Similarly, in 1959 the Presi-
dent asked for a permanent ceiling of $288 billion with a one-year increase in the tempo-
rary ceiling to $295 billion, but received a $285 billion raise in the permanent limit plus a
$10 billion increase in the temporary limit; in 1962, the President requested a ceiling of
$308 billion through fiscal 1963 but received a temporary increase to $300 billion for fiscal
1962 (although Congress later relented and passed a temporary increase to $308 billion).
See Act of July 1, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-512, 76 Stat. 124; Act of Mar. 13, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-414, 76 Stat. 23; Act of June 30, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-74, 73 Stat. 156; CONG. AND
THE NATION, supra note 96, at 394-95.
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ing on new programs, without increasing taxes.' 0 Thus, although the econ-
omy grew and government revenues increased throughout the decade (go-
ing from $92.5 billion in 1960 to $193.7 billion in 1970),"°' outlays con-
sistently consumed all of the extra funds. Indeed, the 1960s produced what
arguably are the biggest sources of backdoor spending in the federal
budget-i.e., "entitlements" including Social Security, Medicare, and Medi-
caid, which obligate the government to pay benefits, without limit, to all
who qualify for program benefits. 10 2 During this decade, Congress raised
the debt limit several times'03 and the national debt grew by nearly one-
third, from $286 billion in 1960 to $371 billion in 1970.'04 To be sure, some
of this increase in outlays was caused by the Vietnam War-but the war,
which cost approximately $173.2 billion,'015 accounted for less than 8% of
the total $1.4 trillion in outlays spent by the government from 1961 to
1970, 106 and less than 7% of the total $2.5 trillion in outlays spent from 1965
to 1976 (the budgetary period for which the costs of the war have been
measured). 107
10 0 See BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 89, at 134-42; GORDON, supra note 13, at
140. Indeed, by the end of the 1960s, Republican President Richard Nixon declared with
confidence that, "We are all Keynesians now." See GORDON, supra note 13, at 140.
10 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1105 (providing Federal Fi-
nances Statistics Table for 1929-1970). This is equivalent, in 2004 dollars, to an increase
from $586.25 billion in 1960 to $936.55 billion in 1970. See CPI, supra note 45 (using
consumer price index of 29.6 for 1960 and 38.8 for 1970).102 See BROWNLEE, supra note 44, at 129; GORDON, supra note 13, at 152.
103 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-39, 81 Stat. 99 (raising the perma-
nent limit to $358 billion, with provision for future temporary increases of $7 billion annu-
ally); Act of June 29, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-327, 78 Stat. 225 (increasing temporarily to
$324 billion); Act of May 29, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-30, 77 Stat. 50 (increasing temporarily
to $309 billion); Act of Mar. 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-414, 76 Stat. 23 (increasing tempo-
rarily to $300 billion); Act of June 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-69, 75 Stat. 148 (increasing
temporarily for one year to $298 billion).
104 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1117 (providing Federal Debt
Statistics Tables for 1791-1970); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 322 (2003) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT TABLES] (Federal Re-
ceipts, Outlays and Debt Statistics Table for 1960-2003). Because inflation was so high
during this period, however, the growth of the debt in terms of real dollars was effectively
zero. Specifically, once adjusted for inflation, the debt of $286 billion in 1960 translates to
approximately $1.8 trillion, which is equal to the adjusted current value of $1.79 trillion
for the $371 billion debt of 1970. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index of
29.6 for 1960 and 38.8 for 1970).
105 See ANTHONY S. CAMPAGNA, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIETNAM
WAR 96 (1991) (listing the actual budgetary costs of the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1976).
106 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1116 (Federal Outlays by
Major Function Statistics Table for 1940-1970); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT TABLES, supra
note 104, at 322 (providing Federal Receipts, Outlays and Debt Statistics Table for 1960-
2003). Compared with World War II, which cost approximately $288 billion and accounted
for 75.5% of the $381.7 billion in total outlays spent by the government from 1941 to
1946, the relative impact of the Vietnam War on the American economy during the 1960s
is miniscule. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1117 (providing Fed-
eral Debt Statistics Table for 1791-1970); U.S. POLITICS ONLINE, STATISTICAL SUMMARY,
AMERICA'S MAJOR WARS, at http://www.uspoliticsonline.com/archives/warcost.htm (listing
the financial cost of World War II: 1941 -1945).
o7 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 1116 (Federal Outlays by
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The 1960s also initiated a new phase in congressional-executive re-
lations concerning the debt limit statute, as Southern Democrats and Re-
publicans in Congress began using votes on debt limit increase requests as
occasions to attack the fiscal policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions. '0
The 1970s continued the spending and debt expansion trend of the
1960s, producing an increase in the national debt from $381 billion in 1970
to $909 billion in 1980.1° Significantly, this 245% increase in the debt
occurred despite the fact that rapid inflation bumped numerous taxpayers
into higher marginal brackets and caused a 267% growth in revenues dur-
ing the same period, from $193 billion in 1970 to $517 billion in 1980."'
The rapid rise of the debt during the 1970s had two procedural con-
sequences for the fiscal constitution: enactment of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the "Budget Act of 1974")"'
and the addition of the "Gephardt Rule" to the standing rules of the
House of Representatives." 2 The Budget Act of 1974 was inspired by Presi-
dent Nixon's efforts to curtail congressional spending through the im-
poundment of funds appropriated by Congress."3 Its drafters designed it
to create a cohesive congressional budget and thereby inspire greater con-
gressional control and responsibility with respect to budget aggregates.1
4
The Act's creation of a centralized budget process with aggregate priori-
ties set by a single budget committee, rather than several appropriations
subcommittees, increased party control and manipulation of the budget
process at the expense of diverse floor deliberation.5
Major Function Statistics Table for 1940-1970); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT TABLES, supra
note 104, at 322 (providing Federal Receipts, Outlays and Debt Statistics Table for 1960-
2003).
10, See 3 CONG. AND THE NATION: 1969-1972 64 (Robert A. Diamond ed., 1973).
lo9 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT TABLES, supra note 104, at 322 (providing Federal Re-
ceipts, Outlays and Debt Statistics Table for 1960-2003). This is equivalent, in 2004 dol-
lars, to an increase of $23 billion, from $1.84 trillion in 1970 to $2.07 trillion in 1980. See
CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index of 38.8 for 1970 and 82.4 for 1980).
110 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT TABLES, supra note 104, at 322. Adjusted for inflation,
this is equivalent in 2004 dollars to an increase in revenues of approximately $246.8 bil-
lion, from $933.2 billion to $1.18 trillion. See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index
of 38.8 for 1970 and 82.4 for 1980).
" See Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat 297 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (2000)).
112 See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
"3 See Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional Abdica-
tion, 19 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 7, 35-37 (2000).
"4 See id. at 36-37 ("Reformers in 1974 assumed that members of Congress would be-
have more responsibly if they voted explicitly on budget aggregates and faced up to totals
....1).
5 See Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process, supra note 9, at 715-18
(discussing ways in which the 1974 Budget Act increased party control over the fiscal policy
agenda); see also infra text accompanying notes 160-165 (regarding majority party domi-
nance of the budget process).
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The burgeoning of the debt in the 1970s also produced the "Gephardt
Rule" in response to the difficult political situation confronting members
of Congress, who faced increasingly frequent votes to raise the statutory
debt limit.' 6 Failure to increase the limit would result in default on the
government's loan obligations; but many members refused to vote in fa-
vor of an increase, either in protest against the fiscal irresponsibility of
serial deficits or for fear of the reelection consequences (political chal-
lengers had begun using incumbents' debt limit votes against them in
subsequent campaigns). 17 In order to avoid the unpleasantness of peren-
nial debt limit votes and insulate debt limit increases from the political
pressures that often caused them to fail in the House," 8 the House of
Representatives crafted a change in its standing rules and passed it as part
of a temporary extension to the debt limit in 1979."' House Rule XXIII
(formerly Rule XLIX), known as the "Gephardt Rule": (1) automatically
increases the debt limit whenever the concurrent budget resolution sets
the limit at a level different from that otherwise in effect for the relevant
period; (2) presumes or renders this level approved by the House upon
passage of the budget resolution; and (3) provides for enrollment of a bill
setting the debt limit at this presumed level to be sent to the Senate with-
out a separate vote by the House.
120
Thus, whereas Congress in the 1960s came to view legislation increas-
ing the statutory debt limit as inevitable, in the 1970s it came to view such
legislation as a painful, if necessary, evil from which political cover was
required.
"6 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-333, 92 Stat. 419 (temporarily in-
creasing ceiling to $798 billion); Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-252, 92 Stat. 185
(extending temporary limit of $752 billion); Act of Oct. 4, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-120, 91
Stat. 1090 (temporarily extending and increasing limit to $752 billion); Act of June 30, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-334, 90 Stat. 793 (temporarily increasing limit to $700 billion for fifteen
months); Act of Dec. 3, 1973, 87 Stat. 691, Pub. L. No. 93-173 (further increasing and extend-
ing the temporary ceiling of $465 billion); Act of Mar. 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-232, 90
Stat. 217 (increasing and extending temporary ceiling to $627 billion); Act of July 1, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-53, 87 Stat. 134 (extending existing temporary ceiling of $465 billion for
five months).
"7 See JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 49, 122, 181-82, 267
(2d ed. 1981), cited in R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 106
(1990); see also 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 165 (Mary Cohn ed., 1984).
'Is See, e.g., H.R. 12641, 95th Cong (1978) (raising temporary debt ceiling to $849.1
billion defeated by vote of 167-288). See also 39 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 239 (Mary Cohn ed.,
1983).
119 See Act of Sept. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-78, 93 Stat. 589 (raising temporary debt
limit to $879 billion and creating House Rule XLIX), as amended by Act of Sept. 13, 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 1066; Act of May 23, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-34, 97 Stat. 196
(1983) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2000)).
120 House Rule XXIII; 5 CONG. AND THE NATION: 1977-1980 227 (Martha V. Gottron
ed., 1981).
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3. Debt and the Debt Limit Statute in the 1980s and 1990s
The 1980s continued the debt expansion trends of the previous two
decades, as federal spending on entitlements and the Star Wars program
escalated steadily with no correlation to revenues. 2 '
The decade also wrought noticeable shifts in Congress's use of the debt
limit statute. First, Congress in 1983 eliminated the distinction between
permanent and temporary debt ceilings. 12  By this time, it had become
clear that the use of temporary debt limit increases not only was failing to
restrict the growth of the national debt, but was resulting in the need for
multiple debt limit votes, sometimes within a few months of each other.
123
Elimination of the temporary ceiling was designed to ease political pres-
sures associated with the debt limit by reducing the number and frequency
of debt limit votes. It also gave the Treasury Secretary greater flexibility,
since he or she no longer would face automatic reversion of the debt ceil-
ing to a substantially lower limit upon expiration of the temporary limit,
and thus could refinance and shuffle funds to remain technically within
the limit for some time even after borrowing hit the permanent debt ceil-
ing. 124
Second, as deficits spiraled out of control in the early part of the decade,
members of Congress resolved to do something about it other than sym-
bolically vote against periodic debt limit increases. Support grew for some
kind of legislative reform aimed at reversing the historical trend away
from balanced budgets and debt reduction.125 In 1985, a bipartisan team
of senators used a vote on debt limit increase legislation as a vehicle to
pass the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act (GRH). 2 6 GRH
121 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT TABLES, supra note 104, at 322 (Federal Receipts, Out-
lays and Debt Statistics Table for 1960-2003). The national debt more than tripled during the
1980s, going from $994.8 billion in 1981 to $3.21 trillion in 1990, as the government passed
an enormous tax cut. See id.; GORDON, supra note 13, at 166. Adjusted for inflation, the
debt still more than doubled, increasing in 2004 dollars from $2.05 trillion to $4.61 trillion.
See CPI, supra note 45 (using consumer price index of 90.9 for 1981 and 130.7 for 1990).
122 The change was passed as part of a bill raising the debt ceiling to $1.39 trillion. See
Act of May 26, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-34, 97 Stat. 196. Notably, the bill was passed by a
surprise voice vote in a nearly empty chamber. See 6 CONG. AND THE NATION: 1981-1984
43 (Mary W. Cohn ed., 1985).
23 In 1978 alone, for instance, Congress voted on whether to increase the debt limit
three times; in March, May, and August. See 5 CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 120, at
226 (citing Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-252, 92 Stat. 185; H.R. 12641, 95th Cong
(1978) (defeated); and Act of Aug. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-333, 92 Stat. 419). Similarly, in
1981, Congress voted to increase the limit both in February and in September. See 6 CONG.
AND THE NATION, supra note 122, at 42 (citing Act of Feb. 7, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-2, 95
Stat. 4 (increasing the limit temporarily to $985 billion); Act of Sept. 30, 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-49, 95 Stat. 956 (increasing the limit temporarily to $1.08 billion)).
124 See 39 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 118, at 240.
1'5 Cf WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 72, at 128 (noting that the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Deficit Reduction Act was passed in an environment of "dismay at ever-rising
deficits" and as a rider to the "annual misery of raising the debt ceiling").
126 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
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sought to control national borrowing and force budgetary balance by en-
acting predetermined deficit (i.e., borrowing) maximums for each of the
next five fiscal years.127
The deliberations over GRH delayed passage of the debt limit increase
that year until long after the deadline by which the Treasury Department
had indicated that it would hit the permanent ceiling set by the last debt
limit bill.128 As a result, the government experienced a debt limit crisis
from September 3, 1985 through December 11, 1985.129 During the crisis,
the Treasury Secretary avoided a default by engaging in a series of financial
maneuvers, including redeeming Treasury securities held by the Civil
Service Retirement and Disability Fund earlier than scheduled and disin-
vesting Social Security trust funds to create cash with which to pay pen-
sion benefits due to retirees during the crisis period. 3 °
In response to the 1985 debt limit crisis experience, Congress in 1986
amended federal trust fund law to expand the Treasury Secretary's au-
thority to stave off default during future crises. Specifically, Congress au-
thorized the Secretary to declare a "debt-issuance suspension period" if he
determines that the government has reached a point where additional bor-
rowing would cause it to breach the debt limit."'3 During such "debt-issuance
suspension periods" Congress granted the Treasury Secretary permission:
(1) to suspend automatic investment in the Civil Service Retirement and
Disability Fund, if such investment would cause the government to exceed
the legal debt limit; and (2) to sell or redeem securities or other assets
held by the Fund before maturity, if necessary to prevent the government
from exceeding the public debt limit. 132 Congress also contemplated sepa-
rate legislation prohibiting the Secretary from disinvesting Social Secu-
rity trust funds in the future, but failed to pass such a bill.'33
The national debt continued its steady climb during the 1990s as
well, although the government ran a few surpluses from 1998 to 2000.1
4
177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
127 See id.; Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution:
The Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget "Train Wreck," 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 598 & n.56
(1998).
128 See 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 457 (Mary Cohn ed., 1985).
129 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 3.
130 See id. at 3; 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 128, at 457-58. Later legislation
required the Treasury to restore to the social security trust funds any disinvested securities.
See Act of Nov. 14, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-155, 99 Stat. 814.
131 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, tit. VI,
§ 6002(a)-(c), 100 Stat. 1874, 1931 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 8348(j)(5)(B) (2000)).
132 See id. §§ 8348(j), 8348(k) (added to Title V by Pub. L. No. 99-509 (1986).
133 See H.R. 5050, 99th Cong. (1986); see also 42 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 594 (Mary W.
Cohn ed., 1986).
1'4 The reason for this apparent discrepancy is that the debt subject to limit includes not
only debt actually borrowed by the government from the public, but also intra-governmental
debt owed by one arm of the government to another, for example, treasury securities held
by the Social Security and other retiree trust funds. Intra-governmental debt continues to
rise even when the government runs a budget surplus and pays down the debt held by the
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During the 1990s, as in the 1980s, members of Congress started viewing
votes on debt limit increase legislation less as political suicide and more
as a vehicle for passage of budget-reform or other unrelated legislation.
Procedurally, the House of Representatives began to waive the Gephardt
Rule designed to provide political cover on debt limit votes.'35 And in 1995,
the Gingrich-led 104th Congress openly and brazenly sought to use legis-
lation increasing the debt ceiling to force President Clinton to accept sweep-
ing reforms, including a seven-year plan to balance the budget-although
the tactic backfired infamously.'36 A popular 1990s proposal for a Balanced
Budget Amendment similarly sought to use the debt ceiling as its primary
enforcement mechanism.'37
In 1999-2000, in light of projected surpluses, Congress proposed low-
ering the debt limit for the first time in fifty-three years. 3 ' Despite substan-
tial support in the House, however, the proposal never was enacted.'3 9
Even if the proposal had passed, any reduction in the statutory limit would
have been temporary and illusory. This is because intra-governmental
debt-generated through the mandatory investment of Social Security and
other trust fund surpluses in treasury securities-is included in the amount
subject to the statutory limit, which means that the debt subject to limit
can rise even while the government is running budgetary surpluses. 4 °
It is too early to evaluate meaningfully trends regarding the national
debt and the debt limit statute in the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury. But three tentative observations are possible. First, the enormous
tax cuts,' 4 ' increased spending,'42 and return of deficits in the last four
public, because the money invested by the trust funds is wholly separate from that used to
fund government appropriations and federal law requires the trust funds to invest in treas-
ury securities irrespective of whether the government runs a surplus or a deficit. See PHILIP
D. WINTERS, CONG. RES. SERV., No. RS21 111 THE DEBT LIMIT: THE NEED TO RAISE IT AF-
TER FOUR YEARS OF SURPLUSES, CRS-1 (2002); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, DEBT SUBJECT TO
LIMIT, supra note 19, at 47.
'15 The Gephardt Rule has been waived in every year from 1995 until 2002. See WIN-
TERS, supra note 134 (discussing waiver of the Rule from 1995 to 2001); see also Norman
Ornstein, Congress Inside Out: The Perils of Misunderestimation, ROLL CALL, Jan. 27, 2003,
available at http://www.rollcall.com/pub/features/Welcome-Congress/welcome-congress/
263-1.html (discussing revival of Rule in 2002).
136 See, e.g., 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-65 (Jan Austin ed., 1995); Gettinger, supra note
18, at 1400 (noting comment by House Speaker Newt Gingrich that he was "eyeing" the debt
limit bill as a "hammer" to force the President to accept Republican reforms).
117 See S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995). See generally Seto, supra note 19 (providing a
thorough discussion of this proposed Amendment and the manner in which it sought to use
the debt limit).
38 See H.R. 4601, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 4866, 106th Cong. (2000).
"9 See 146 CONG. REC. H4722 (daily ed. June 20, 2000) (recording House vote on
H.R. 4601 at 419 ayes to 5 nays).
'40 See WINTERS, supra note 134, at CRS-1.
141 See, e.g., Economic Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
'42 See U.S. BUDGET FY 2005 HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 14, at 22 (Summary of
Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits(-): 1789-2009) (showing rapidly increasing
annual spending during the period between 2000 to 2004, including annual increases of
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years "'43 demonstrate that the surpluses of 1998-2001 were not the result
of a sustained or pervasive change in government attitudes towards budget
balance or debt reduction. Second, Republicans in Congress seem to be
returning to the debt limit avoidance tactics of the 1980s by, inter alia,
resurrecting the Gephardt Rule in 2003 after eight years of disuse.'"
Third, President George W. Bush's efforts to fund a massive war on terror
without raising taxes-and while in fact cutting taxes' 45-portend expo-
nential expansion of the national debt, particularly when viewed against
the national history and precedent of paying for major wars with a com-
bination of tax increases and federal borrowing, rather than federal bor-
rowing alone.
Thus, the period from 1980 to the present seems to have cemented
the trend begun in the 1960s, in which serial deficits and a mounting na-
tional debt are the norm, and government surpluses the aberration. In-
deed, in the past forty years the Treasury has made almost no effort to
pay down the debt, and the national debt figure has not declined once
during that period. 4 6
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLES OF THE
DEBT LIMIT STATUTE IN THE NATION'S BORROWING AND
DEBT REPAYMENT PROCESS
As government attitudes towards debt incurrence and repayment have
changed over the last fifty years, so too have attitudes towards the debt
ceiling and debt limit statute. The ceiling has gone from being viewed as
a statutory fixture to be raised only in times of war or economic depres-
sion to being considered more of a legal index that must be raised every
year or few years-in response to requests from the Treasury or the Presi-
dent-in order to sustain general, unspecified, government spending. More-
over, the debt limit statute as a whole has transformed from a mere dele-
$150 billion in each year from 2001 to 2004); see also Jonathan Weisman, Conservatives
Dispute GOP Budget Claims, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2003, at A6 (observing that President
Bush and the Congress had enacted three straight years of double digit increases in federal
spending).
143 See U.S. BUDGET FY 2005 HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 14, at 22 (showing re-
turn of budget deficits in 2002 and 2003, as well as projected deficits for 2004-2009, fol-
lowing four years of surpluses).
'44 See Ornstein, supra note 135. There also was some talk about attaching the debt limit
increase to the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Bill in order to insulate it. See, e.g., Bill
Ghent, House Debt Ceiling Passage Clears Way for Supplemental, CONG. DAILY, June 28,
2002, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0602/062802cdam .htm.
"I See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Stat. 52 (2003) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1); William Hanley, Battles Ahead for Who-
ever is Elected, FIN. POST, Nov. 2, 2004, at FPI (noting that George W. Bush is the first
President in the nation's history to cut taxes during wartime).
146 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS TABLES, supra note 26, at 110 (Federal Debt Statistics
Table for 1940-2004); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT TABLES, supra note 104, at 322 (Federal
Receipts, Outlays and Debt Statistics Table for 1960-2003).
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gation to the Treasury Secretary of specific borrowing authority to a gen-
eral grant of borrowing power that even includes permission/ratification of
fiscal maneuvering to circumvent the debt ceiling when Congress delays
in increasing it. These developments have led some to label the statutory
debt limit a dangerous anachronism that threatens national default, and to
call for its repeal.147
While such criticism is not entirely without merit, it derives from a
superficial understanding of the statute's operation. Upon careful evalua-
tion, it is clear that the statute retains enduring value. First, the statute
plays a constitutionally necessary role in effecting congressional control
and accountability over borrowing and the national debt. Second, it serves
as an important intra-institutional check on special interest and behind-
closed-doors party dominance over national fiscal policy.
A. Constitutional Principles of National Borrowing and Debt Payment
Congress's authority over policy concerning the national debt stems
from Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 ("to pay the Debts") and 2 ("to borrow
Money on the credit of the United States"). 48 On its face, the first im-
poses a fiscal obligation on Congress while the second confers broad fiscal
authority. But as with many provisions in our Constitution of limited federal
powers, this is not all that the clauses dictate or demand. Inherent in the
clauses' language is a sense of balance, of congressional control and ac-
countability for national borrowing and the debt it creates. From these
clauses, we can derive three principles of congressional borrowing and debt
payment.
First, a Principle of Regulated Borrowing: Congress has the power to
regulate the terms and conditions under which the nation borrows funds.
The power to borrow money encompasses power to regulate the terms on
which the money will be borrowed-e.g., to fix interest rates, loan for-
mat, maturity dates, and to decide from whom the government shall bor-
row. Indeed, during the early years of our nation's history, it was estab-
lished that Congress's power to borrow included the incidental power to
incorporate a national bank from whom it would borrow, thereby creating
conditions under which national borrowing could take place safely and
efficiently.'49 The Principle of Regulated Borrowing also entails congres-
sional control over the terms on which the government repays its debt.
147 See discussion infra Part III.
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 2.
'49 The preamble of the bank legislation broadly stated that the bank was "conceived
... [to] be very conducive to the successful conducting of the national finances" and "[to]
tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans, for the use of the government, in sudden
emergencies." Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191; see also J. Randy Beck, The New
Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 605 (citing 2
ANNALS CONG. 1897-1900 (1791) (debates about the constitutionality of the national bank)).
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Thus, for instance, one of the first controversies that faced the newly minted
Congress in 1790 involved whether the old national debt should be re-
deemed at face value or present market value.1 5 1
Second, a Principle of Borrowing and Debt Control: It is Congress's
prerogative and duty to decide how much the nation will borrow and for
what purposes. The power to borrow money would be merely administra-
tive if it did not entail control over the amount and basis for borrowing.
Thus, inherent in the power to borrow is an obligation, as the branch most
closely connected to the populous, to exercise judgment in deciding when
and under what circumstances to commit the nation and the public to in-
debtedness.
Third, a Principle of Repayment: Debts incurred on behalf of the
United States must be honored, and Congress has the power and obliga-
tion to ensure that payments are made on the national debt. This principle
derives both from the plain language of Clause 1, empowering Congress to
"pay the Debts" of the United States, 5 ' and from the history of our fed-
eral constitution. It is well-established that one of the primary concerns
motivating the Constitutional Convention in 1787 was the Framers' frus-
tration with the Articles of Confederation and the fledgling United States'
inability to pay its Revolutionary War debts thereunder.'52 Indeed, the
Federalist Papers, published with the purpose of convincing the American
public to ratify the new constitution, specifically cite the necessity of en-
suring repayment of the Union's "debts to foreigners" as a reason for creat-
ing the federal government and constitution.'53 Moreover, they specifically
tie the need for a federal taxing power to a "plan of extinguishment" for
outstanding national debts.'54
In addition, the structure of Article I, Section 8 implies that Con-
gress is to be accountable to the people regarding its decisions about na-
tional borrowing and repayment of the debt with which it saddles the na-
tion. The first clause of Article I, Section 8 confers both the power to tax
and the power to pay debts; the power to borrow is conferred immedi-
ately thereafter, in the section's second clause. This structure is no acci-
dent. The three powers are listed together because they are interrelated.
As noted above, the founding fathers created the power to tax with re-
payment of the national debt in mind, and payments on the debt can be
150 See, e.g., GORDON supra note 13, at 24-28. The terms of the redemption were con-
troversial because many of the original holders of the old national debt had sold it, at far
below face value, to wealthy merchants who would now reap a windfall if the debt were
redeemed at its full face value. See id.
1' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
152 See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-28 (First Vintage Books ed. 1997); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787:
THE GRAND CONVENTION 47-49 (W. W. Norton ed., 1987) (1966).
153 THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
154 See THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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made only if revenue is raised by the federal government. Further, the
power to pay debts counterbalances the power to borrow, or incur debt, and
the power to tax is both a present alternative to the power to borrow and a
future means of raising funds with which to repay monies borrowed in
the present.
It is axiomatic that the founders intended for Congress to be directly
accountable to the people concerning any tax burdens imposed upon the
public-hence the explicit constitutional requirement that all legislation
for raising taxes originate in the popularly elected House of Representa-
tives.'55 The side-by-side location of Congress's constitutional powers to
tax, pay debts, and borrow money at least implies that the public account-
ability required of Congress in the tax context also should apply to con-
gressional decisions in the related fiscal contexts of national borrowing
and debt repayment.
Finally, the borrowing and debt payment clauses create a limitation
on executive power. Congress's power to borrow is a check and a balance
against the executive branch and precludes the President from directing
the Treasury to issue debt whenever he believes it appropriate. Indeed,
Congress's "power to borrow Money" would mean nothing if the Presi-
dent could instigate national borrowing without congressional consent;
likewise, congressional authority to pay the nation's debts would be for
naught if the executive could redirect funds allocated by Congress for
debt repayment.
B. Institutional Benefits of the Debt Limit Statute
As political scientists extensively have theorized, there are a number
of institutional dynamics inherent in the legislative process that are exac-
erbated and can produce less than ideal outcomes in the context of fiscal
policymaking. The debt limit statute acts as a check, or counterbalance,
that can alleviate some of the problems produced by these institutional
dynamics. This Part of the Article first reviews political theories that high-
light flaws in the legislative fiscal policymaking process and then examines
how the debt limit statute and debt ceiling help counteract some of these
flaws.
1. Pluralist or Interest Group-Based Dynamics
Pluralist, or interest group, theories describe the legislative process
as driven by organized interests who compete against each other for poli-
cies that benefit their members. Legislators act as "brokers" between various
interests and enact into law some combination of what different interest
"I See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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groups request. 56 Some pluralist or public choice theories see govern-
ment officials as little more than rubber stamps validating policies cre-
ated by interest groups.'57 Within this framework, not all interests are
equal: organized, financially well-supported groups exercise dispropor-
tionate influence upon legislators and legislation is said to become skewed
in their favor.' s Average citizens, whose interests are diffuse and out-
weighed by the costs of interest group formation, lose out as their posi-
tion goes unrepresented.' 59 From a fiscal perspective, these theories sug-
gest that government spending and the national debt will have a tendency
to spiral out of control as a result of excessive congressional acquiescence to
requests from organized, well-funded interest groups. The diffuse public
interest in controlling spending and minimizing national borrowing and
debt, meanwhile, will lack advocates and thus will have little effect on
fiscal policymaking.
2. Decision Theory and Party Control Dynamics
Decision theories of legislation emphasize the effect of institutional
rules and structures on policymaking outcomes. Arrow's Theorem, for
instance, asserts that most decisions made by majority vote in Congress are
not truly majoritarian, but rather are a function of the rules that govern the
presentation, debate, and voting structure of various policy choices.'60 Some
decision theorists have focused on majority party control of internal con-
gressional rules as a method of effecting party leaders' interests and poli-
cies at the expense of more balanced and representative legislation.' 6 ' In
the budget context, scholars have posited that party control of the budget
committees, budget resolutions, and rules governing deliberation over
budget legislation has led to top-down budgeting based on majority party
leaders' priorities.'62 Indeed, negotiations concerning budget priorities some-
156 See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 343 (1988).
117 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 49 (3d ed. 2001).
5I See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 141-43 (1965); see
also ELMER SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 31 (1960).
"I See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1982); Max Reynolds, Note, The Impact
of Congressional Rules on Appropriations Law, 12 J.L. & POL. 481, 483 (1996).
160 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873, 903 (1987), cited in Reynolds, supra note 159, at 482.
16! See, e.g., GARY W. Cox & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN:
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 233-34 (1993).
162 See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 993, 994, 997 (1990) (observing that "[a]ppropriations decisions, for exam-
ple, are made by a handful of powerful legislators who ensure majority passage through
'log rolling' and the "enormous budgetary power wielded by a select group of legislators");
Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process, supra note 9 at 715-16; see also Charles Tiefer,
supra note 8, at 435-47 (discussing congressional Republicans' extraordinary use of inter-
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times occur outside of Congress, behind closed doors between party leaders,
leaving majority preferences and concerns unaccounted.' 63
Further adding to the problems caused by interest group politics and
party dominance in the budget process was the switch, in early 1975,
from a seniority system for appointment of House committee and sub-
committee chairmen, to a system in which committee chairmen are selected
by vote of the majority party caucus every two years." While the senior-
ity system allowed experienced committee chairmen, safe in their seats
and their chairmanships, to consider the national interest when making
budget policy, the new system has put the budget in the hands of legisla-
tors with a greater need to please both their constituents at home and fel-
low party members in order to ensure reelection to Congress and their
chairmanships, respectively.
65
3. Deliberative Theories and Dynamics
By contrast, republicanism, or deliberative, theories offer a less pes-
simistic view of the legislative process. Such theories derive from the
Madisonian vision, expressed in Federalist No. 10,166 of factions checking
factions, and hold that congressional procedure should be structured to
encourage deliberation, information gathering and sharing, so as to create
careful and considered legislative outcomes. 167 Deliberative theories place
significant emphasis on the selection of rules and procedures that provide
incentives for individual legislators to develop policy expertise and to
share policy-relevant information with fellow legislators. 68 An ideal de-
liberative legislature is one in which collective benefits are reaped from
individual legislators' information gathering and policy expertise, and
distributive spending is kept in check by legislative majorities rather than
disproportionately doled out to well-funded special interests. 69 In other
words, legislative procedure is designed to promote enactment of laws
aligned with median chamber preferences, rather than to give something
nal rules and procedure to effect President George W. Bush's $1.35 trillion tax cut in 2001).
163 See Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process, supra note 9, at 717 (citing Krish-
nakumar, supra note 127, at 589, 595, 603).
"A See House Rule X, cl. 5(a)(1) ("The standing committees specified in clause 1 shall
be elected by the House at the commencement of each Congress, from nominations sub-
mitted by the respective party caucuses.").
165 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 159.
166 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
167 See, e.g., HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 154, 695 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey
eds., 1994); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (1985).
168 See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 5 (1991).
169 See id. at 6.
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to everyone at the expense of the collective good or to allow one party to
railroad its preference past the other.170
To this end, deliberative theories prefer a multi-layered legislative proc-
ess that encourages individual legislators to gather information and pre-
sent policies aimed at the collective, public good, over a system that al-
lows quick and easy enactment of new laws.
C. The Debt Limit Statute as Check and Balance
The debt limit statute plays an important role in the fiscal constitu-
tion both by helping Congress to fulfill its constitutional obligations un-
der the borrowing and debt repayment clauses and by ameliorating many
of the institutional problems inherent in the legislative process that pro-
duce the national budget and fiscal policy.
First, the debt limit statute facilitates congressional fulfillment of the
Regulated Borrowing Principle by providing a mechanism through which
Congress can maintain control over the terms of national borrowing. Various
sections of the statute require Congress, inter alia, to prescribe the forms
of debt that the Treasury Secretary may issue, set boundaries regarding the
debt's maturity period, and provide guidelines for the Secretary to work
within when fixing the maximum amount of a particular type of security
that any one person may hold.17 ' Within limits delineated by Congress,
the statute also delegates authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to
regulate specific conditions governing the issuance of government debt,
including the rate of interest, the conditions for redemption, and the sales
price.72 Thus, the statute enables Congress both to delegate and to check
executive branch borrowing authority.
Second, the debt limit statute helps Congress maintain ultimate au-
thority over the amount of national borrowing, thereby enabling Con-
gress to abide by the Principle of Control. It is no longer practically fea-
sible for Congress to approve each individual issuance of government debt,
as it did prior to 1917. Although the statute does not preserve the close
connection between national borrowing and a specific purpose that once
existed-e.g., bonds issued to the public to raise money for war 7 3-it at
least maintains congressional control over the absolute amount that the
nation borrows. Further, debt limit increase bills have inspired additional
legislation, such as GRH, that is designed to restore a more direct correla-
170 See id.
71 See 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3101-3107 (Law. Co-op 2003 & Supp. 2004).
172 See id. §§ 3105(c)(4)-(5), 3107; see also 4 CONG. AND THE NATION: 1973-1976 70
(Patricia Ann O'Connor ed., 1977) (discussing amendments to the statute that increase the
dollar limit on the amount of long-term bonds the Treasury is authorized to sell at interest
rates above 4.25%).
173 See WINTERS, supra note 5.
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tion between congressional spending and borrowing and to strengthen con-
gressional control over the annual amount borrowed.
7 4
Third, the debt limit statute helps Congress to fulfill its obligation to
ensure payment of the nation's debts (the Principle of Repayment) and to
be accountable to the public. Most straightforwardly, the statute is the
vehicle that Congress uses to appropriate funds for the redemption and
retirement of outstanding government debt. 75 But perhaps more impor-
tantly, the statute's requirement that Congress vote periodically to increase
the debt limit provides public accountability for Congress's borrowing
and debt repayment practices.
In addition to facilitating Congress's fulfillment of its constitutional
obligations, the debt limit statute counteracts some of the institutional prob-
lems inherent in the federal budget process and helps foster the delibera-
tive ideal of congressional operation. Specifically, the necessity of peri-
odic votes to raise the statutory debt limit forces Congress to address the
size of the national debt, as well as the need to minimize it for the public
and the future generations who ultimately will have to repay it. These are
issues that have no interest group advocate and that benefit a diffuse, un-
organized class of citizens. Debt limit increase votes compel Congress to
face up to the aggregate, collective consequences of its spending conces-
sions to individual interest groups. 176 Compulsion of such aggregate con-
siderations was, of course, one of the goals of the 1974 Budget Act, 177 but
the process created by that Act has failed miserably in forcing Congress
to reckon with the consequences of its actions. In fact, some have argued
that the Act has resulted in "escapist budgeting," whereby members of
Congress collude with each other to set spending and other budget targets
at high levels and then pass out spending concessions to members and
interest groups, all while claiming credit for staying within the targets set
171 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1037. GRH operated by fixing specific deficit (i.e., borrowing) targets for the
next five years; if, based on CBO and OMB estimates, Congress was unable to reduce deficits
to these levels in its annual budget, then an automatic sequestration procedure would kick
in and implement across-the-board cuts on various government spending programs in an
amount sufficient to cause the annual deficit to meet the predetermined borrowing (deficit)
target. GRH was enacted with the idea that sequestration would never have to be used; the
deficit (i.e., borrowing) caps and the threat of across-the-board cuts were supposed to force
Congress and the President to exercise greater restraint in spending and borrowing on the
nation's behalf. See Stith, supra note 2, at 633-52; Krishnakumar, supra note 127, at 598-
99 and accompanying citations to the statute.
'75 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3111-3112 (2000) (setting up "sinking funds" for redemption of the
public debt).
176 To be sure, the connection between congressional spending and borrowing highlighted
by votes to increase the debt ceiling remains loose and oblique. But the remedy for this is
greater congressional accountability, to make Congress explain the reasons or purpose for
which it is borrowing, not, as some have suggested, the elimination of the debt ceiling and
of congressional involvement in the issuance of national debt. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
177 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 113, at 37.
[Vol. 42
In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute
in the budget resolution.'78 Within this framework, publicly visible votes
to increase the debt limit have proved one of the few effective media for
shaming Congress and for inspiring serious reforms and summits focused
on debt reduction. 1
79
More specifically, there are a number of ways in which the debt limit
increase process motivates members of Congress to behave in a more fiscal-
ly responsible manner than they do in the annual budget and appropria-
tions context. First, debt limit increase legislation serves a scolding and
"make amends" function. Even if members of Congress do not them-
selves care about deficits or the growth of the debt, they perceive that the
public does care and pays at least some attention to debt limit increase votes,
as evinced by Congress members' reluctance to vote in favor of such leg-
islation and the fact that congressional challengers often use an incum-
bent's "yes" vote against the incumbent in election campaigns.8 0 This fear,
or attention to public perception, in turn makes members of Congress more
likely to think in terms of and vote along with debt reform measures in-
troduced by their more fiscally conservative colleagues, in part as repara-
tions for their prior uncontrolled spending.
Second, debt limit increase legislation falls under the jurisdiction of
the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees, rather
than the party-dominated Budget Committees. 8' Thus, the debt limit statute
and the passage of debt ceiling increases remove some of the emphasis
on majority party priorities from the fiscal policymaking process. As dis-
cussed in Part II.B.2, the congressional budget process lends itself to be-
ing commandeered by majority party leaders, absent significant input from
other members of Congress, and can tend to contain disproportionate
concessions to the interest groups favored by that party. Votes to increase
the debt limit make majority party members publicly accountable for the
consequences of their budget priorities, as highlighted by members' reluc-
tance to take debt limit votes and by inventions such as the Gephardt Rule. 82
Moreover, such votes give average majority party members, minority
members, and the traditionally fiscally conservative members of the Sen-
ate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees a voice in the na-
tional borrowing process as well as a chance to elucidate the link (often
78 See, e.g., id. at 37-38; Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS
AND THE EXECUTIVE 206 (2d ed. 1987).
'79 See infra Part II1.B (discussing specific instances in which debt limit votes inspired
legislative reform or summits aimed at debt reduction).
80 See, e.g., Ghent, supra note 144 (discussing political difficulty of debt limit in-
creases and efforts to shield such legislation by passing it along with supplemental appro-
priations measures); 7 CONG. Q. SERVICE, supra note 49, at 42-43; KINGDON, supra note 117,
at49, 122, 181-82, 267.
8 See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 96-912 Gov., A Brief Introduction to the
Federal Budget Process, available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/information/
info-6b.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
182 See text accompanying note 254; see also sources cited supra notes 180-181.
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intentionally obfuscated by majority party leaders) between government
budget policies and the need for national borrowing.'83
Third, and related to the second, interest groups do not plague, or even
truly participate in, the debt limit increase process the way they do in the
appropriations and general budget processes. Strategically, it makes sense
for special interest groups to lobby members over forcefully concerning
annual appropriations bills that immediately affect them, because these
bills determine whether there will be money available in the coming months
for the programs these groups want." In fact, such interest groups often
have special relationships with members of the appropriations commit-
tees that hold jurisdiction over the funding of their projects, and thus are
able to exert influence effectively during this process." 5 Debt limit legis-
lation, however, raises no immediate concerns about the funding for next
month's operations. While interest group lobbyists certainly are capable
of recognizing the connection between how much the debt limit is in-
creased and the availability of funding for their operations one or two years
down the line, that connection is remote and non-threatening. 8 6 Hundreds
of individual appropriations combine to make up the annual deficit (amount
of national borrowing), so no one interest group has any reason to think
that its particular appropriations will be cut in order to stay within the
new debt limit, even if the limit set for the next year or two dictates an
overall cut in expenditures. This is especially true for interest groups that
are entrenched with their respective appropriations committee members.
In fact, special interests may well want to distance themselves from
the larger debate about the debt limit, for fear of identifying themselves
or their programs as related to or even responsible for the deficit and mount-
ing debt. Further, even if a particular interest group believed that the level at
which the debt limit was being set would require future cuts in its fund-
183 See, e.g., Treasury Revises Debt Ceiling Deadline to Mid-May, CONG. DAILY, May 1,
2002, Appropriations (quoting comments by members of Congress regarding the relation-
ship between the Bush Administration's $1.35 trillion tax cut and the need for a $450 billion
increase in the debt limit in 2002); see also It's All In How You Look At It, CONG. DAILY,
May 16, 2002, Budget (describing the statutory debt limit as a "powerful political tool for
the minority" and a "powerful reminder" of the necessity for structural reform of Social
Security and Medicare).
1'4 See WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 72 (explaining that appropriations must be
voted each year if program funding, including funding for government agencies, is to con-
tinue).
185 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 795, 801
(1999) (arguing that "Congress is in its least deliberative cast of mind in the appropriations
process, where members routinely auction off government largesse to the interest groups
that are best positioned to support members' reelections"); see also WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN,
supra note 72, at 53 (describing the relationship between "specialized publics" and gov-
ernment agencies, and these agencies' ongoing contacts with appropriations committees).
186 See Elizabeth Garret, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 415 (1998) (explaining that interest groups
have limited incentives to become actively involved in macrobudgeting legislation because
they cannot be certain how such big picture fiscal decisions will affect their particular pro-
grams).
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ing and wished to lobby against this, the group would not be as well placed
to do so: it is the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Com-
mittees that handle debt limit legislation, not the appropriations committees
with whom the interest group may have special influence.'87
Fourth, the debt limit statute serves a deliberative function, encour-
aging members of Congress to live up to the deliberative principles ex-
pressed in republicanism theories of legislative behavior.'88 Specifically,
the single-issue nature of debt limit increase legislation enables those mem-
bers of Congress who are so inclined to devote greater attention to con-
sideration of the national debt, and the fiscal policy that engendered it, than
is possible in the time-pressured annual budget process. In fact, the budget
appropriations and reconciliation processes have grown so time-pressured
and complicated that adequate deliberation no longer is possible on the
myriad provisions of annual funding or entitlement legislation,'8 9 let alone
on "tangential" issues such as the impact that such budget legislation will
have on the national debt. Because deliberations about debt limit increases
are passed as separate legislation outside the appropriations and reconcilia-
tion processes (unless Congress makes the increase part of an omnibus
appropriations or reconciliation package), they provide an independent
opportunity for discussions about the national debt and the reasons for its
growth and give members of Congress who are truly concerned with the
size of the debt a forum in which to suggest changes aimed at putting the
nation's fiscal house in order. 90
This Article does not intend to suggest that debt limit increase bills,
which are themselves time-sensitive, must-pass legislation, provide a per-
fect forum for deliberation about the national debt. The point rather is that
they provide at least some forum for such deliberation. In fact, debt limit
increase bills have served not only as vehicles for bipartisan fiscal reform
87 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1182-
83 (1993) (arguing that the broad jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance committees keeps them freer from interest group influence and capture than com-
mittees with jurisdiction over one substantive area, such as the Agriculture Appropriations
Subcommittees).
88 See supra Part II.B.3.
1'89 See Devins, supra note 9, at 396-99 (1988); Krishnakumar, supra note 127, at 616-18.
190 See, e.g., Increase in Federal Debt Limit: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On Long
Term Growth and Debt Reduction of the Sen. Comm. On Finance, 107th Cong. 105 (2002)
(statement of Gene B. Sperling, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution) (discussing histori-
cal trends in debt incurrence and repayment from 1980s to 2002); 145 CONG. REC. H661-
701 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1999) (discussing growth of national debt in past five years alone
and advocating repeal of Gephardt Rule); S. REP. No. 99-144, at 27 (1985) (including
statements by Senator Armstrong discussing size of national debt, history of its growth,
amount paid in interest on debt each year, and advocating debt reduction plans), reprinted
in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 979, 985; S. REP. No. 98-279, at 13 (1983), reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1475, 1479-80 (including statements by Senator Symms (R-Idaho) that "[i]t
is important that the Congress recognize that an increase in the debt ceiling clearly high-
lights the fiscal problems of our nation" and discussing growth of debt since World War II
and need for reducing spending in future).
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measures, but as catalysts for subsequent negotiations about debt reduc-
tion. As discussed earlier, in 1985, a vote to increase the statutory debt
limit produced bipartisan debt reduction legislation in the form of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. 19' Debate over increases in the debt limit
ceiling in 2002 similarly prompted a bipartisan proposal to control gov-
ernment spending and reduce the deficit, although the proposal did not
ultimately become law.' 92 Likewise, debt limit increase legislation passed in
1979 carried an amendment directing the House and Senate Budget commit-
tees to draw up plans for balancing the fiscal 1981 and fiscal 1982 budg-
ets'93 and legislators in 1987 used the debt limit increase bill (in the wake
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bowsher v. Synar) 94 to force the Reagan
Administration to engage in discussions about a fix for the GRH seques-
tration procedure and other procedural reforms to the budget process.' 95
III. DEBUNKING POPULAR CRITICISMS OF THE DEBT LIMIT STATUTE
Despite the deliberative benefits it provides, the debt limit statute is
far from popular. In fact, it has been the subject of substantial criticism
and calls for repeal from a number of political observers and commenta-
tors. 196 Such critics level three main charges against the statute: (1) it is
an unnecessary anachronism; (2) it functions as a legislative pawn; and
(3) it creates threats to the nation's credit rating. These criticisms both exag-
gerate flaws in the statute's operation and overlook the continuing, con-
stitutionally important, role that the statute plays in the fiscal policymak-
ing process.
A. Reports of the Debt Limit's Irrelevance Are Exaggerated
Critics claim that the evolution of congressional fiscal processes has
rendered the statutory debt limit an anachronism, and bills to raise it are
no more than retrospective "housekeeping" legislation that serve to effect
spending decisions previously made by Congress. 197 In other words, they
191 See supra text accompanying note 126; see infra text accompanying notes 208-209.
192 See, e.g., Feingold, Gramm Developing Proposal To Reduce Deficit, CONG. DAILY,
Apr. 8, 2002, Budget.
193 See Act of Apr. 2, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-5, 93 Stat. 8 (1979) (Long-Muskie amend-
ment, amending the Second Liberty Bond Act (1917)); see also Congress Uses Debt Limit
Measure ... To Shield Controversial Amendments, CONG. Q. SERVS., 5 CONG. AND THE
NATION, 1977-1980, at 227 (Martha V. Gottron ed., 1981).
94478 U.S. 714 (1986).
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Wehr, Budget Talks Set as Congress Raises Debt Limit, 45 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 985 (1987).
196 See, e.g., supra note 19.
"9 See, e.g., Use of Trust Funds to Avoid Default, Hearings Before the House Commit-
tee on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong. (1995), available at 1995 WL
13415405 (testimony of Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin) (quoting Congressional Budget
Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update, 48, 54 (Aug. 1995) (calling the
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argue that the debt limit has become merely a mechanism for allowing
government borrowing to catch up to government spending, rather than
for creating borrowing policy. This criticism oversimplifies the relation-
ship between government spending and government borrowing and ig-
nores the role that the debt limit plays in checking executive borrowing.
First, general government spending decisions never have been tied di-
rectly to borrowing decisions, even in the period before the debt limit statute
was passed. Rather, during the pre-debt limit era, Congress passed legis-
lation authorizing the Treasury to borrow a specified amount for a given
purpose-e.g., to fund war-time spending decisions that either currently
were being made or in the near future would be made. Procedurally, this
is not much different from what modern debt limit increase legislation
does. In fact, the main difference in the two regimes is substantive-i.e.,
whereas pre-debt limit authorizations of debt issuance arose in connec-
tion with a specified purpose, the debt limit statute and modern debt limit
increases authorize the Treasury to borrow up to a specified amount, for
any, unspecified, purposes.
Further, while the need to raise the debt limit might be considered
retrospective housekeeping necessitated by prior government spending,
the accumulation of which has caused the debt ceiling to be reached, the
determination of how high to set the new limit is a prospective one re-
quiring congressional evaluation of how much the nation should be al-
lowed to borrow to meet upcoming spending needs. Nor is the amount by
which the debt limit must be increased a foregone conclusion; in fact it is
a subject on which Congress and the President have disagreed on a num-
ber of occasions, each time with the President advocating higher increases
than Congress has been willing to authorize.' In this sense, modern debt
limit increase decisions are not unlike pre-1917 decisions to authorize
debt limit an "anachronism")); George Hager, Debt-Ceiling: Short Term Focus, 48 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 2485, 2485 (1990) (describing debt limit as "simple fiscal housekeeping"
that "typically attracts numerous controversial riders").
198 Congress has, for instance, approved debt limit increases in amounts smaller than
that requested by the President in 1958, 1959, 1962, 1973, 1989 and 2002. See 4 CONG.
AND THE NATION, supra note 172, at 62-63 (describing congressional extension of the
existing $465 billion limit and subsequent increase of the limit to $475.5 billion despite
President's request for a $485 billion ceiling); GOP Pushes $450 Billion Debt Limit In-
crease Through, USA TODAY, June 27, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2002/06/28/debtlimit.htm (describing Congress's passage of a $450 billion debt
limit increase instead of $750 billion increase requested by President); sources cited supra
note 93; see also 8 CONG. AND THE NATION: 1989-1992 44 (Colleen McGuiness ed., 1993)
(stating that Congress extended the limit to $3.12 trillion, $120 billion less than the amount
requested by the Treasury); Jackie Calmes, Debt Bill, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2767
(1989) (Treasury requested $3.24 trillion limit). In inflation-adjusted dollars, this means
that Congress passed an increase that was $40.14 billion less than the President requested
in 1973 ($9.5 billion less in 1973 dollars), $312.8 billion less in 2002 ($300 billion less in
2002 dollars), and $165.3 billion less than in 1991 ($120 billion less in 1991 dollars). See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 45 (using index of 44.4 for 1973, 179.9 for
2002, and 136.2 for 1991).
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borrowing for upcoming (wartime) spending needs, in an amount deter-
mined by Congress.
Second, if the debt limit statute were repealed, and the Treasury De-
partment given permanent, standing authority to incur debt, Congress would
abdicate its control over the power to borrow and expand executive branch
authority over government borrowing to an extent impermissible in our
separation of powers system. For without the debt limit, all control over
debt issuance would shift to the Treasury Secretary, a member of the Presi-
dent's Cabinet, leaving the President effectively in command of govern-
ment borrowing. The suggestion that such a transfer of power would have
no noticeable effect on the nation's borrowing policy because it relates to
a "housekeeping" matter is at best unconsidered. Indeed, such a transfer
of power might well amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power to the executive branch."9
There is a reason that those who drafted the constitution located the
power to borrow, along with the power to tax, in the legislative rather than
the executive branch: they wanted to keep these important fiscal powers
close to the American people rather than give the electorally removed
President unfettered discretion to make decisions that would affect the
people's pocketbooks."° Indeed, absent the need for congressional consent
to issue debt, the President could cause the government to borrow well
beyond anticipated amounts, with little public accountability. The Presi-
dent would have an incentive to underplay or even obfuscate the expected
cost of programs or tax policies favored by his party, secure in the knowl-
edge that he controlled the government's ability to issue debt to pay for
these policies and that such debt could be incurred with impunity, absent
a public vote or debate in Congress. Congress could of course seek to revise
19 Because the federal constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. I. § 1, courts have
held that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another branch. See
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). However, modem courts also have recognized the
practical necessity of allowing Congress to delegate some of its power, and thus allow such
delegation where Congress lays down "intelligible principles" to guide (or cabin) the dele-
gatee's exercise of power. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). Al-
though its constitutionality does not appear ever to have been questioned, the debt limit
statute seems to be a valid delegation of Congress's borrowing authority to the Treasury
Secretary because it places several constraints or guidelines on the Secretary's authority,
see supra Part I.B.1 and text accompanying notes 154-155, as well as maintains congres-
sional control over the absolute borrowing amount through the debt ceiling. If, however,
the statute were eliminated, and the Treasury Secretary given unfettered authority to bor-
row, the "intelligible principles" rule, and the nondelegation doctrine, might well be violated.
200 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 394 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (arguing that Congress's "power over the purse, may in fact be regarded as the most
complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate repre-
sentatives of the people"); 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 377 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (debate of Mar. 1, 1793) (reporting comment made by James
Madison shortly after ratification of the constitution that "appropriations of money [are] of
a high and sacred character; [they are] the great bulwark which our Constitution [has] care-
fully and jealously established against Executive usurpations").
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programs or policies once their true costs became clear down the line, but
it would lack the ready-made public forum for calling attention to such
costs that currently is provided by deliberation on votes to increase the
debt limit."'
Third, elimination of the debt limit statute would absolve Congress of
its accountability for government borrowing and the size of the national
debt and could cause Congress to abandon entirely its duty to manage the
level of the nation's indebtedness (the Principle of Control).2 2 In fact, Con-
gress could conspire with the President in an effort to hide from the pub-
lic the consequences of the government's budget policies. In other words,
repeal of the debt limit statute could encourage the worst tendencies of in-
terest group politics-i.e., rampant logrolling with little incentive at any
level of government to worry about the growth of the national debt and its
effect on the diffuse, unorganized general public, let alone on future gen-
erations. These potential ramifications of eliminating the debt limit dem-
onstrate that it is much more than an inconsequential "catch-up" mecha-
nism, but in fact an important check against congressional and executive
fiscal irresponsibility.
In truth, the reason that debt limit increases appear to constitute mere
housekeeping legislation is because they fail to connect the government
borrowing they authorize with a purpose, as was the case earlier in the na-
tion's history. But the solution to this problem is to reform the statute to
create greater correlation between spending purposes and borrowing, not
to eliminate the debt limit statute and congressional control over national
borrowing altogether.
B. The Legislative Pawn Myth
There is a pervasive belief among political commentators that Con-
gress regularly uses debt limit increases as a tool or vehicle for enacting
numerous unrelated measures that could not garner enough support to pass
on their own or to force the President to accept policies he otherwise would
veto.2"3 But this belief is the product of collective misconception. In fact,
201 For instance, when President George W. Bush's enormous and underestimated tax
cuts and defense spending necessitated nearly $1.4 trillion in increases to the debt limit in
2002 and 2003, Congress was able to use the debt limit votes to bring to light the true costs
of these measures. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Tom Carper, Carper Statement on passage
of Tax Cut Bill and Debt Limit Hike (May 23, 2003), available at http://carper.senate.
gov/press/03/05/052303.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) (describing Bush tax cut bill as
"clouded by smoke and mirrors that mask its true costs" and citing evidence that bill would
cost $1 trillion, rather than the $350 billion estimate given by Republicans); 149 CONG.
REC. S7092 (daily ed. May 23, 2003) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes). Had these debt limit
votes not been necessary, and had President Bush's Treasury Secretary instead had carte
blanche to issue debt without congressional review, these costs likely would not have been
brought to the public's attention.
202 See supra Part II.A.
203 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Riders Line Up for Free Trip On Must-Pass Debt Bill, 47
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an analysis of the final version of debt limit increase legislation passed
by Congress in the past twenty-five years demonstrates that increases to
the limit usually are passed in "clean" form, without unrelated attachments.
Specifically, the statutory debt limit was increased forty-two times in
the twenty-five-year period between 1978 and 2002, inclusive °. 2  Of the
forty-two bills enacted to raise the debt limit during this period, thirty
were passed in clean form with no amendments or additional provisions
hitching a ride to the must-pass increase. 2 5 Further, of the remaining twelve
bills, five contained only minor amendments implementing procedural
changes to the debt limit statute itself-e.g., the Gephardt Rule, and modifi-
cations in the amount of long-term bonds that the Treasury can issue 06
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2767, 2767 (1989) (describing debt measures as a "vehicle" on
which legislators attempt to "hitch rides for pet proposals that otherwise might not pass or
be signed into law on their own"); Stephen Gettinger, supra note 18, at 1400 (calling the
debt limit a "grenade" to be used against the White House); George Hager, Debt Limit Revis-
ited, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2030, 2030 (1990) (describing debt limit increases as "a
magnet for controversial add-ons"); Wehr, supra note 195, at 988 ("Debt bills attract the
most troublesome amendments because their authors hope that the essential nature of the
legislation will overwhelm [White House] objections to their proposals").
204 See generally PHILIP D. WINTERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 96-1 10E DEBT LIMIT
INCREASES, 1978 TO 1995 FACT SHEET ON USES OF THE DEBT LIMIT FOR OTHER LEGISLA-
TION (1996) (listing 37 instances of increases) [hereinafter DEBT LIMIT INCREASES]; 52
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-25 to 2-27 (Jan Austin ed., 1996) (describing passage of three debt
limit increases in early 1996); 53 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-52 (Jan Austin ed., 1997) (report-
ing passage of one debt limit increase bill in 1997); 58 CONG. Q. ALMANAC PLus 6-10 (Jan
Austin ed., 2002) (discussing one increase in 2002).
205 See Act of June 28, 2002, Pub. L. 107-199, 116 Stat. 734; Act of Mar. 12, 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-115, 110 Stat. 825; Act of Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-103, 110 Stat. 55;
Act of Oct. 21, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-12, 107 Stat. 42; Act of Oct. 2, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-405, 104 Stat. 878; Act of Aug. 9, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-350, 104 Stat. 403; Act of
May 15, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-40, 101 Stat. 308; Act of Aug. 21, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
384, 100 Stat. 818; Act of Aug. 13, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-475, 98 Stat. 2206; Act of July 6,
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-342, 98 Stat. 313; Act of Nov. 21, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-161, 97 Stat.
1012; Act of Sept. 30, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-270, 96 Stat. 1156; Act of June 28, 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-204, 96 Stat. 130; Act of Sept. 30, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-49, 95 Stat. 956; Act of
Sept. 30, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-48, 95 Stat. 955; Act of Feb. 7, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-2, 95
Stat. 4; Act of Dec. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-556, 94 Stat. 3261; Act of June 28, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-286, 94 Stat. 598; Act of May 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-256, 94 Stat. 421;
Act of Aug. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-333, 92 Stat. 419; Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-252, 92 Stat. 185. Seven more "clean" increases were passed by including the change to
the debt limit as part of reconciliation or other omnibus budget legislation. See Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251; Act of Oct. 28, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-467, 104 Stat. 1086 (debt limit increase included in continuing resolution on appro-
priations); Act of Oct. 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-461, 104 Stat. 1075 (same); Act of Oct.
19, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-444, 104 Stat. 1030 (same); Act of Oct. 9, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-412, 104 Stat. 894 (same); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (imbedded in Title XIII, § 13411 of omnibus reconciliation bill);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990)
(imbedded in Title XI, § 11901 of omnibus reconciliation bill). See generally WINTERS,
supra note 204.
206 See Act of Aug. 7, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-72, 103 Stat. 182 (debt limit increase bill
contains provision for changing the method of accounting for federal debt instruments);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986)
(noting debt limit imbedded in omnibus reconciliation bill, and the bill also contains a provi-
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Thus, only seven of forty-two debt limit increase bills passed in twenty-
five years carried amendments that did not specifically affect the debt
limit statute. Three of these seven bills, moreover, contained amendments
that did relate to the national debt, although they did not modify the debt
limit statute. These were the Long-Muskie amendment to a 1979 debt limit
increase, which required Congress and the President to present balanced
budgets for fiscal years 1981 and 1982;207 the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
amendment to a 1985 debt limit bill, requiring deficit (and therefore debt)
reduction for the next five years;2 0 8 and the Gramm-Rudman amendment
to a 1987 debt limit bill, 20 9 which reaffirmed GRH and revised the seques-
tration procedure invalidated by the Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar.1 °
In other words, only four of forty-two bills passed to increase the debt
limit in the past twenty-five years-that is, less than ten percent-have
served as vehicles for the enactment of measures wholly unrelated to debt
issuance, debt accounting, or the debt ceiling.2 ' Of course, these statis-
tics do not account for the number of times that members of Congress
offered unrelated amendments to debt limit increase legislation, but only
for the number of times they succeeded in attaching amendments to such
legislation. There is an institutional cost, in terms of time and delibera-
tion, to the consideration of such would-be amendments even if they ul-
timately are rejected, 2 2 and there certainly is room for reform of the debt
sion requiring restoration of interest lost to trust funds during the debt limit crisis in 1985);
Act of May 25, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-302, 98 Stat. 2.17 (increasing the amount of long-term
bonds that could be issued and providing additional administrative authority to the Treas-
ury Secretary); Act of May 26, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-34, 97 Stat. 196 (adding provision
eliminating the temporary part of the debt limit, making the entire debt limit permanent,
and increasing the amount of long-term bonds that could be issued); Act of Sept. 29, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-78, 93 Stat. 589 (containing an increase in the amount of long-term bonds
that could be outstanding and establishing House Rule XLIX to make House approval of
increases in the debt limit automatic upon passage of the budget resolution).
207 Act of Apr. 2, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-5, 93 Stat. 8.
208 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1037.
209 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987).
210 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
21 See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110
Stat. 847 (attaching unrelated measures including an increase in the Social Security earn-
ings limit, an expansion of small-business access to federal courts to challenge federal
regulations, as well as the line-item veto conference report); Act of Nov. 8, 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-140, 103 Stat. 830 (attaching unrelated amendment repealing nondiscrimination rules
dealing with employee benefit plans in tax code); Act of Nov. 14, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
155, 99 Stat. 814 (attaching unrelated provision to extend several expiring acts, including a
cigarette tax for one month, and a debt-related provision requiring restoration of Social Secu-
rity Trust Funds); Act of June 6, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-264, 94 Stat. 439 (attaching unre-
lated repeal of oil import fee imposed under President Carter under the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962; after being vetoed by Carter, this provision became law as a result of a con-
gressional override).
2 See, e.g., 4 CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 172, at 63 (discussing Senate ef-
forts to attach unrelated measures, including legislation pertaining to federal financing for
presidential election campaigns, which although dropped before passage of the final ver-
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limit statute to discourage even the offering of such unrelated amend-
ments, as discussed below in Part IV. But even absent reform, the fact
that less than ten percent of debt limit increase bills passed between 1978
and 2002 carried non-debt-related amendments demonstrates the lie in
the perception that the debt limit statute promotes the undesirable or nonma-
joritarian enactment of measures that otherwise would not garner enough
votes to pass Congress.
Nor has the debt limit proved an effective vehicle for forcing the Presi-
dent to accept legislation he otherwise would veto. On the contrary, his-
tory teaches that presidents are quite willing to veto debt limit increase
legislation, despite its must-pass nature, when such legislation contains pol-
icy measures that the executive branch cannot stomach. Congressional
efforts to blackmail the President into accepting massive fiscal policy
reforms by attaching the "Contract with America" agenda to a debt limit
increase backfired spectacularly in 1995.2"3 A congressional attempt to
trap the President into changing a controversial oil import policy in 1980
likewise met with a veto.2 4 Significantly, these are the only two times Con-
gress actually has attached to debt limit legislation unrelated measures it
knows the President to oppose, rather than merely contemplated such
measures but then dropped them from the bill's final version. In fact, aside
from the oil import amendment in 1980, the few non-debt-related amend-
ments that Congress has attached to debt limit increase legislation have
involved popular measures to which the President had no objection.2' 5
Thus, fears or criticisms that debt limit legislation serves as a legis-
lative pawn and a weapon against the President are greatly exaggerated
and do not support calls for repeal of the debt limit statute or ceiling. In-
deed, to the extent that debt limit increase legislation can be used to in-
sion of the debt limit bill, stalled enactment of the debt limit increase until two days after
the previous limit expired).
2 3 See 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 136, at 2-63 to 2-65 (1995); WILDAVSKY &
CAIDEN, supra note 72, 325-26.
214 See DEBT LIMIT INCREASES, supra note 204, at CRS-2. Congress then overrode the
veto, making its preferences law, but it failed in its effort to get the President to acquiesce
in the policy change.
25 See 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 204, at 2-25-2-27 (characterizing Social
Security earnings limit and small business court access amendments to 1996 debt limit bill as
"sweeteners"); id., at 2-25 (calling amendment to 1996 debt limit increase bill that increased
the Social Security earnings limit "widely popular"); 45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 19 (Robert W.
Merry ed., 1989) (describing 1989 amendment repealing nondiscrimination regulations
dealing with employee benefits as "popular"). It is true that debt limit increase legislation
helped carry budget reform in 1985 (GRH) and forced promises for budget negotiations
and balance in 1987 and 1979, respectively. But those debt limit bills did not "force" any-
thing upon the President; President Reagan favored GRH in 1985, and a promise to negoti-
ate towards deficit reduction was not a substantive concession to which President Carter
was opposed in 1979. See, e.g., George Hager, Reconciliation: Finding Ways Around Dis-
aster, 37 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2864, 2864 (1995) (observing that Reagan initially supported
GRH and "jumped to endorse it publicly").
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spire discussions or promises to discuss debt reduction, this is a positive
feature and should be encouraged.
C. The Debt Limit and Threats to the Nation's Credit
Finally, the debt limit has been criticized for creating situations that
threaten the credit and financial standing of the United States govern-
ment. 216 Specifically, critics complain that congressional efforts to attach
unrelated amendments or fiscal reform packages to debt limit increase
legislation bog Congress down and delay enactment of the increase legis-
lation itself, sometimes until after the date when the current limit is reached.
This in turn can bring the nation to the "brink" of default on its out-
standing obligations, as the Treasury is left without authority to borrow
additional funds needed to make timely payments on its loans. 217 The threat
of default, even absent actual default, is said to cause market uncertainty
regarding the United States' ability to honor its financial obligations and
accordingly to cost (or threaten to cost) the nation in elevated premiums
and yield rates. 2
18
Of the criticisms leveled against the debt limit statute, this is the most
legitimate. But it too is exaggerated. While it is true that debt limit in-
crease bills sometimes become delayed, Congress always ultimately has
passed them. 21 9 In fact, in the eighty-six years since the debt limit statute
was enacted, the nation never once has defaulted on its obligations. More-
over, debt limit crises, during which a real possibility of default emerges
as a result of congressional delays in raising the debt ceiling, have been
few and far between.122 Indeed, the lessons learned from the most infa-
mous such crisis in 1995 will likely discourage future excessive delay in
raising the debt ceiling, teaching Congress that there is a public price to
pay for holding the debt limit hostage, even in pursuit of budget balance
or debt reduction, and that Congress rather than the President would bear
the political blame for provoking a debt limit default.2
2
'
Moreover, if and when a debt limit crisis does occur, Congress has
created a safety net by providing the Treasury Secretary with authorization
to engage in a number of maneuvers that allow the government to stay
216 E.g., Press Release, Dept. of Treasury, Remarks of Assistant Secretary for Financial
Markets Brian C. Roseboro to the Bond Market Association's Inflation-Linked Securities
Conference New York, NY, No. JS-506 (June 26, 2003) available at http://www.ustreas.
gov/press/releases/js506.htm (commenting that, in 2002, "the U.S. was placed on 'credit
watch' by Moody's").
217 See id.; Abramowicz, supra note 19, at 578-79.
218 See Press Release, supra note 216.
219 58 CONG. Q. ALMANAC PLUS, supra note 204, at 6-11.
220 Such crises have occurred only in 1985 and 1995. See supra Part I.C.3, text accom-
panying notes 128-132 (discussing 1985 crisis); George Hager, Budget Battle Came Sooner
Than Either Side Expected, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3503, 3508 (1995) (discussing 1995
crisis).
221 See WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 72, at 330-35.
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technically within the debt limit, and thus to prevent default, until a debt
ceiling increase is enacted. These maneuvers include delaying auctions of
marketable securities, suspending investment in the Civil Service Retire-
ment and Disability Fund, and selling securities or other assets held by
the Fund before maturity.2 22 Once the limit has been raised, Congress has
instructed the Treasury Secretary to undo the effects of its crisis-period
maneuvering by restoring investments and paying interest to any affected
funds. 223 Thus, little to no harm actually has come to the nation's credit or
financial standing even during the limited periods in its history when
congressional foot-dragging has raised the spectre of government default.
24
But although the likelihood of default on government obligations is
hypothetical and exaggerated, and although Congress and the Treasury
have invented ample maneuvers to stave off default, the situation created
by congressional failure to enact a debt limit increase before the prior limit
has been reached is undesirable and should be discouraged. The maneu-
vers engaged in by the Treasury Secretary, with Congress's consent, are
essentially accounting tricks designed to enable the Treasury to borrow
beyond the statutory limit without specific congressional authorization.
This is problematic from both a political and a constitutional viewpoint
because: (1) Treasury gimmickry with government trust funds and auc-
tions creates an appearance that the rules governing those entities are
manipulable and that Congress views these funds as less than sacred, and
(2) such maneuvering circumvents, for a limited period of time, the legis-
lative check on national borrowing. But again, the answer to these prob-
lems is not to eliminate the debt limit statute or the debt ceiling; it is to
reform the statute so as to remove, or at least minimize, the incentives and
opportunity for excessive congressional delay in passing debt limit in-
creases, as discussed in Part IV.
D. State Experiences with Debt Limits
While state debt limits differ in some respects from the federal debt
limit statute, they do offer some transferable lessons. Most notably, the
state experience demonstrates the inaccuracy of popular criticisms that debt
limits serve no useful function and bear no connection to borrowing pol-
icy.
222 See 5 U.S.C. § 8348(j)-(k) (2000) (added to title by Omnibus Budget Reconciliaton
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 19 at
52-54.
223 See 5 U.S.C. § 8348(j)-(k).
224 U.S. Treasury maneuverings sometimes can create minor additional interest costs
for the government, but these amounts are negligible relative to the size of the national
debt. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 216 (discussing $20-30 million interest cost re-
sulting from delay in timing of a note auction-this interest cost amounts to .0003% of the
$7.3 trillion national debt).
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Most state constitutions contain some form of debt limitation.2 1 5
These limitations take various forms, ranging from outright prohibitions
against incurrence of state debt226 to different forms of caps on the amount
of debt that may be incurred2 7 to requirements that issuances of state
debt be approved by public referendum or legislative supermajority.2 8 Many
state constitutions, however, also contain amendments that permit debt
incurrence, beyond the general limit, for specific purposes.229 Although there
are a number of ways states can and do get around these limits,2 3 ° the lim-
its generally have served as some form of check on borrowing and the
growth of state debt.23'
225 See Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsight-
edness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1301,
1315 (1991).226 See id. at 1315 & n.80 (citing ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; IND. CONST. art. X, § 5;
TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 24; W. VA. CONST., art. X, § 4). See also D. Roderick Kiewiet &
Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded
Indebtedness, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62 (1996) (Table I listing type of constitutional debt
limitation each state possesses).
227 Some state constitutions, like the federal statute, limit state debt to a maximum dol-
lar figure. See ARIZ. CONST., art IX, § 5 ($350,000 limit); COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 3
($100,000); NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 ($100,000); OHIO CONST. art. XII, §§ 1, 3 ($750,000);
OR. CONST. art. XI, § 7 ($50,000); TEx. CONST. art. III, §49 ($200,000); VA. CONST. art. X,§ 9 (setting limit but permitting issuance of revenue bonds, if authorized by two-thirds of
the voters). Others limit the incurrence of new debt as a percentage of total revenue or of
assessed value. See GA. CONST. art. VII, § IV (no new debt if debt service exceeds 10% of
total revenue from the preceding fiscal year); HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 13 (debt service may
not exceed 18.5% of average general fund revenues in the state over the past three fiscal
years); NEV. CONST. art IX, § 3 (debt limited to 1% of assessed value); UTAH CONST. art.
XIV, § 1 (debt limited to 1.5% of value of taxable property).
228 A handful of states set a maximum cap on debt but require a public referendum or
legislative supermajority even for the issuance of debt that does not exceed the cap. See
KAN. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6-7 (referendum), WYo. CONST. art 16, §§ 1, 2 (referendum), S.D.
CONST. art. XIII, part 1. Another set of states permits unlimited debt, but only if the incur-
rence of debt is approved by public referendum. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11; IDAHO
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 50; Mo. CONST. § 37; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; N.Y.
CONST. art. VII, § 11; N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. of
amend. XXXI, § I. A few states permit unlimited debt without a referendum if the debt is
approved by a legislative supermajority. See DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (three-quarters of
each legislative chamber must approve); Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9(b) (three-fifths of each
chamber must approve); MASS. CONST. art. 62 (two-thirds of each chamber must approve).
Another group of states requires both a legislative supermajority and approval by public
referendum. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 14; MICH. CONST. art.
IX, § 15.
229 See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 225, at 1316.
230 See, e.g., Charles W. Goldner, Jr., State and Local Government Fiscal Responsibil-
ity: An Integrated Approach, 1991 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 936-37 (1991) (describing
"inventiveness and creativeness" of state finance officers in circumventing state debt limits
and listing some of their methods); Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 226, at 63-64 (noting
that "constitutional debt limitations are not insurmountable obstacles"); Sterk & Goldman,
supra note 225, at 1330-33 (discussing state debt limit "escape devices," including "special
fund" financing for particular projects, leasing arrangements whereby states pay "rent"
instead of pay interest on bonds, and the creation of quasi-independent "public authorities"
that can borrow to accomplish a specific project).
231 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-5, at 11 (1995), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. (commenting
that "continued deficit spending by the States has been a rarity" and that "more States incur
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State experiences with debt limitations differ from the federal experi-
ence in that state debt limitations effectively require state legislators (su-
permajority states) or the public (referendum states) to approve specific
instances of debt issuance, for specific purposes. Even when states seek to
end-run debt limits without submitting to referendum or supermajority votes,
such end-runs typically meet with legal challenges and require resolution in
court, where judges evaluating the compliance of legislative issuances of
debt with the state constitution tend to focus-either overtly232 or cov-
ertly233 -on the purpose for which debt is used. Thus, state issuance of debt
seems to maintain some of the borrowing-purpose connection and ac-
countability that is missing at the federal level, by requiring the functional
equivalent of the pre-1917 federal debt issuance system-i.e., individual
votes and approval-of each and every debt issuance (above the constitu-
tionally established maximum).
Notably, one empirical study of state debt limitations has found that
states that prohibit debt incurrence altogether, by placing a dollar limit
on debt incurrence, or requiring approval by public referendum before
debt may be incurred are particularly effective at controlling or minimiz-
ing state debt issuance."' 2 The study interestingly also has found that leg-
islative supermajority requirements for raising constitutional debt limita-
tions are ineffective, and in fact tend to lead to greater debt incurrence
than does the absence of debt limitations altogether. 35 The authors of the
study suggest that this is because supermajority requirements produce
borrowing logrolls in which legislators exchange costly favors in order to
assemble the higher number of votes necessary to pass a debt limitation
increase. They argue that this should serve as a lesson for Congress about
the uselessness of balanced budget and other debt reduction proposals that
seek to limit debt incurrence through the use of a supermajority voting
requirement.23
6
The state experience with debt limits thus indicates that the exis-
tence of a borrowing maximum tends to have some minimizing effect on
general surpluses than incur general deficits"); Goldner, supra note 230, at 950-51 (noting
that "debt limits serve a very real purpose"); Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 226, at 63, 93
(empirical study finding that states that certain types of state debt limitations-e.g., refer-
endum requirements-are highly effective at limiting state debt issuance); Sterk & Gold-
man, supra note 225, at 1302 ("Constitutional debt limits, even if often underenforced,
have served effectively to protect against the worst sorts of legislative abuse.").
232 See, e.g., Sterk & Goldman, supra note 225, at 1348-51 (describing Virginia Su-
preme Court's "animating purpose test," which upholds projects it believes fall within the
realm of "proper governmental function" and rejects projects that do not).
233 See id. at 1340-48, 1351-58 (arguing that judicial review of Kentucky, Illinois, Vir-
ginia, and Florida legislatures' special fund and public authorities borrowing decisions
effectively operates as a "second look" at the decision to incur debt, with courts upholding
those borrowing decisions whose purpose they approve and invalidating those which they
do not approve).
234 See Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 226 at 63, 93.
235 See id. at 93.
236 See id.
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the amount that legislatures borrow, particularly if there must be public
involvement and accountability before the maximum can be exceeded.
Analogizing to the federal context, this data suggests that the existence of
a statutory debt ceiling acts as a check against excessive executive and
congressional borrowing, and that the public accountability associated with
debt limit increase votes serves as an incentive for Congress to minimize
the overall amount of debt incurred on the nation's behalf.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE DEBT LIMIT STATUTE AND
INTERNAL LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES
In order to adequately address both the constitutional obligations and
the practical criticisms concerning national borrowing discussed in ear-
lier parts of this Article, suggested reforms to the debt limit statute and debt
ceiling increase procedures should proceed from a few basic principles:
(1) there should be greater congruence between government borrowing and
its purpose; (2) Congress should be accountable to the public for its bor-
rowing decisions and for the size of the national debt; (3) incentives for,
and the likelihood of, delays in passing debt limit increases that cause the
debt ceiling to be breached should be eliminated or at least minimized;
and (4) while there is nothing wrong with national debt and some level of
debt financing is necessary and even desirable for government projects,
congressional debate and deliberation over methods for controlling the
size of the debt should be encouraged. To these ends, this Article recom-
mends the following reforms.
A. Changes in Internal Legislative Rules
1. Rule Changes that Promote Congressional Accountability
The following proposals aim to give the debt limit statute additional
teeth (or replace some of the teeth that have been removed in the past by
resourceful legislators) and prevent members of Congress from using debt
limit legislation as a mere catch-up mechanism237 rather than to face up to
the aggregate consequences of their borrowing and spending policies. First,
the House of Representatives should repeal the Gephardt Rule providing
for automatic increases in the debt limit as stated in the budget resolution.
This Rule operates as a legislative sleight-of-hand that enables the House
to avoid public accountability for its borrowing choices and, as a result,
encourages abdication of Congress's constitutional duty to manage or con-
trol the amount of debt incurred. The Principle of Borrowing and Debt
Control,238 derived from the power to borrow and the duty to repay debt, re-
237 See supra Part III.A.
238 See supra Part II.A.
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quires more from Congress than the automatic approval of a borrowing
figure chosen by the Treasury, President, or even the budget resolution
(which after all is crafted by the Budget Committee and party leaders); it
requires congressional contemplation of the need and purpose for addi-
tional debt incurrence and some evaluation of the debt repayment path on
which the nation is headed. The Gephardt Rule allows most members of
Congress (435 of 535) to escape this public reckoning by making the
amount of debt limit increases seem automatic, inevitable, and technical.
Moreover, it closes off opportunities for individual members of the House to
bring to the fore any concerns they might have about the reasons for con-
gressional borrowing. In short, the Gephardt Rule makes congressional de-
cisionmaking about debt issuance a veiled rather than publicly visible
process and thus serves the needs of majority party leaders, and at times
the President, at the expense of the congressional rank and file.1
9
Second, Congress should institute a new procedural rule, perhaps as
part of the debt limit statute itself, requiring that increases in the debt
limit be passed as a separate piece of legislation, independent of omnibus
budget reconciliation bills or continuing resolutions. Inclusion of a debt
limit increase in omnibus budget legislation provides even greater insula-
tion and opportunity for shirking accountability on debt limit votes than
does the Gephardt Rule. Like the Gephardt Rule, such bundling allows
members of Congress to duck their accountability for raising the debt limit
by rendering the vote to increase merely a side-note to a much larger meas-
ure. Worse, bundling exacerbates the problems of the Gephardt Rule by
extending its political insulation to both chambers of Congress, since omni-
bus budget reconciliation legislation and continuing resolutions shepherd
debt limit increases through the Senate as well as the House. Further, bun-
dling of debt limit bills with omnibus budget legislation enables the
President, particularly if his party controls Congress, to push through debt
limit increases suited to his budget priorities with little public account-
ability for the correlation between the two.24 °
Third, Congress should implement a rule requiring that all tax and
entitlement legislation passed outside the budget process contain a state-
ment 'of its expected impact on the size of the national debt and the time
frame within which the government will hit the existing debt ceiling.
Such a rule would require Congress to spell out for the public the conse-
239 See, e.g., Omstein, supra note 135, available at http://www.rollcall.com/pub/features/
WelcomeCongress/welcome-congress/263-1.html (noting that the Gephardt Rule tends to
be favored by the party in the majority and citing Republicans' resurrection of the Rule in
2003 following much complaining about it during periods of Democratic control of Con-
gress).
240 See, e.g., 9 CONG. AND THE NATION, 1993-1996 55 (Ann O'Connor et al. eds.,
1997) (discussing how the Clinton Administration and the Democratic leadership circum-
vented "lengthy debate" and controversial amendments and passed debt limit increase with
"virtually no debate" and "little fanfare" by incorporating the increase into the omnibus
reconciliation bill).
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quences, in debt terms, of tax cuts and expenditures as well as entitle-
ment spending increases. Moreover, it would create some political cover
for Congress at times when it raises taxes or cuts spending, by counter-
balancing these unpopular legislative acts with an automatic, required report
on the beneficial consequences such measures will have on the national
debt.
2. Rule Changes that Minimize Delays in the Debt Limit Process
In addition, both houses of Congress should institute a procedural rule
requiring that any amendments offered to a debt limit increase bill be ger-
mane. "Germaneness," in this context, should mean related to the debt
limit statute itself or related to the incurrence or repayment of debt. Thus,
the rule should be defined to permit amendments such as GRH and the
Long-Muskie amendment implementing deficit (i.e., "debt incurrence")
targets and balanced budgets (i.e., a "no debt incurrence" rule), respec-
tively.24" ' A germaneness rule of this type would facilitate the timely pas-
sage of debt limit increases by removing from the process the prolonged
consideration of unrelated measures that sometimes delays enactment of
the increase.242 Such a rule would go further, in a sense, than the germane-
ness requirement contained in the Gephardt Rule, since it also would ap-
ply to the Senate. But, unlike the Gephardt Rule, it simultaneously would
encourage, rather than cut off, congressional deliberation and proposals
aimed at debt control.
B. Changes to the Debt Limit Statute
1. The Definition of Debt Subject to Limit
Under the current statute, the debt subject to limit-the amount in-
cluded in the statutory figure Congress periodically must raise-is com-
posed of two types of debt: Treasury-issued debt held by the public (indi-
viduals or non-government entities) and intra-governmental Treasury debt
held by government accounts (mostly trust funds).2 43 This means that the
debt subject to limit is both an over- and under-inclusive reflector of how
much money the government has borrowed. It is over-inclusive because it
241 See discussion and legislation cited supra Part IllB, & notes 205-207.
242 See, e.g., 42 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 133, at 562 (discussing how action on
debt limit increase was stalled, in part, due to Senate battles over South Africa sanctions
and U.S. aid to contra rebels); 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 117, at 166 (explaining
that delay in passage of third debt limit increase of the year "was due not to objections
over the measure itself, but to a dispute over an arcane real estate tax provision"); 4 CONG.
AND THE NATION, supra note 172, at 62 (describing how Senate filibuster of unrelated
campaign finance amendments delayed final approval of a debt limit increase until after the
temporary limit had expired).
243 See WINTERS, supra note 134, at CRS-1.
2005]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
counts as federal debt money that is invested in Treasury bonds by gov-
ernment accounts such as the Social Security Trust Fund, even though
such money is invested automatically whenever the trust funds run a sur-
plus, and is in fact unrelated to whether the federal budget runs a surplus
or a deficit.2"4 It is under-inclusive because it omits some debt issued by
the Treasury-e.g., silver certificates, as well as almost all federal agency
debt. 24
5
Although the relative amount of federal debt excluded from coverage
under the statutory debt limit is small, 246 this discrepancy should be cor-
rected in order to render the debt subject to limit a more accurate reflector of
the amount of money borrowed (and owed) by the government, and to
comply with the constitutional requirement that Congress authorize and
manage government borrowing. Similarly, intra-governmental debt held
by trust funds and the like should be excluded from the debt subject to
limit figure, since it does not in any way reflect debt issued to the public.
Removal of intra-governmental debt from the debt limit calculus would
enable the debt subject to limit to decline in years when the government
runs a surplus, resulting in a number of advantages. First, such a struc-
ture would reward Congress and the President publicly for keeping the
nation's fiscal house in order and thus would create an extra incentive for
such debt reduction. Second, such a structure would allow the statutory
debt limit to be lowered if the nation were to put itself on a path to debt
reduction, something that is not practical under the current system, in
which the debt subject to statutory limit can climb (because of trust fund
investments) even in years when the amount of debt held by the public
falls. Indeed, it is because of trust fund investments that the debt subject
to limit continued to rise from 1998 to 2001, despite budget surpluses
and a decline in the amount of debt held by the public."47
2. Timing and Statements of Purpose
Timing is an important external factor in the debt limit process, ex-
erting subtle pressure and influence on the shape that debt limit legisla-
tion takes. A debt limit increase that becomes due in April or May will be
handled, debated, and presented to the public differently than one that
becomes due in September or October. Hence an important question: Where
in the budget cycle should debt limit increases ideally be considered? At
244 See id.
245 See OFFICE OF MGMT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1997, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 194 (1996).
246 See WINTERS, supra note 134, at CRS-1 and n.l (estimating the amount of federal
debt excluded from the debt limit, as of the end of fiscal year 2001, to be approximately
$101 billion, and calculating that the debt limit currently accounts for 98.3% of total fed-
eral debt).
247 See id. at CRS-2.
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first blush, it might seem that increases in the debt limit should be made a
fixed or mandatory part of the annual budget, to be debated and discussed
at the budget resolution stage and passed as part of appropriations or rec-
onciliation legislation in the fall. 248 After all, if forcing Congress to pay
more attention to the correlation between spending and national debt is a
primary goal of debt limit reform, then tying debt legislation to spending
legislation would appear to be a logical solution. But this Article does not
advocate such an approach, for a number of reasons.
First, experience teaches that folding the debt limit into omnibus budget
legislation results in less, not more, deliberation about government bor-
rowing. The budget appropriations and reconciliation processes already
are complicated and demand congressional attention to a vast array of fund-
ing and revenue issues; as it is, members of Congress often do not have
enough time to read, let alone deliberate about, all of the provisions in
omnibus budget bills. 249 When debt limit increases become part of this mix,
they both detract from the time spent on other budget matters and receive
less attention than they would as stand-alone legislation. Indeed, congres-
sional leaders sometimes purposely have wrapped debt limit increases in
omnibus budget legislation precisely to avoid extended deliberation
over.2 10 Moreover, enveloping debt limit increases in comprehensive budget
legislation can result in "escapist budgeting," as members of Congress
use the large legislative vehicle of omnibus bills to barter concessions while
collectively looking the other way regarding the effect on the size of the
national debt.'
In order to avoid these problems while still maintaining some con-
nection between congressional spending and borrowing, debt limit in-
creases should be scheduled so that they become necessary in November
or December of each year.252 This could be accomplished by amending
248 The debt limit is already part of the budget resolution in that the resolution lists the
anticipated impact of its spending or revenue totals on the limit. And appropriations and
reconciliation legislation have sometimes in the past carried debt limit increases. See, e.g.,
Act of Oct. 19, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-444, 104 Stat. 1030; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. N o. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312. But that is different from requiring that the
budget resolution become a forum for debate about how much the debt limit should be
increased (rather than merely listing a figure derived by adding and subtracting other pre-
determined figures) and from mandating that debt limit legislation always or only be passed as
part of an appropriations or reconciliation bill.
249 See Devins, supra note 9, at 396-400 (describing limitations on deliberations of con-
tinuing resolutions, in particular for the fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution); Krishna-
kumar, supra note 127, at 616-18 (discussing failure by most members of Congress to read
the text of the 1995-96 budget reconciliation bill and majority party leader Bob Dole's lack
of familiarity with some portions of the legislation).
250 See 9 CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 240, at 55 (noting that the Democratic
leadership "got around" threats of budget-related amendments and lengthy deliberations by
incorporating the debt-limit increase into the reconciliation bill in 1993 and that "[a]s the
leadership hoped, the short-term bill passed with little fanfare").
251 See Fisher, supra note 113, at 37-38.
252 Congress, with the aid of its research organizations, has proved rather apt at calcu-
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the debt limit statute to require that Congress increase the debt ceiling by
no more than the amount necessary to sustain anticipated government
borrowing through the next one year; internal congressional rules could
then establish that the increases be structured to last until the following
November or December. The purpose of this timing is twofold: first, it
places consideration of the debt limit on the heels of appropriations and/or
reconciliation legislation, but late enough that in most years, the appro-
priations and reconciliation processes themselves should not be dis-
rupted; second, it should enable congressional leaders, if consideration of
debt limit increase legislation becomes bogged down, to back the vote on
such legislation against a congressional recess for Thanksgiving or Christ-
mas in order to force Congress to take timely action. This tactic of using
the pressure of a recess to compel finalization of debt limit legislation
has proved surprisingly successful in the past. 53 Further, scheduling debt
limit increases on the heels of budget legislation requires Congress im-
mediately to account to the public for the consequences of its budget de-
cisions.
Indeed, the passage of debt limit legislation at the end of the budget
cycle should be used as a mechanism for explanation, projection, and
contemplation of reform regarding the debt. Specifically, the debt limit
statute could be amended to require that legislation increasing the limit
provide not just a new numerical debt ceiling, but also a statement of how
much Congress expects the different categories of government spending-
e.g., the thirteen sets of appropriations, entitlements, tax expenditures or
cuts, interest on the debt to cost over the next year (based on the budget
just passed) and by how much Congress expects revenues to fall short of
the sum of these costs (or to exceed costs if the budget is in surplus that
year). The debt limit statute should require Congress to spell out the
lating the dollar amount by which it must raise the debt limit in order to meet the govern-
ment's borrowing needs until a specific period into the future, so it should be able to calcu-
late the amount of each year's debt limit increase to last until approximately November of
the following year. See, e.g., 8 CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 198, at 45 (explaining
that increase passed in November of 1990 was estimated to last until spring of 1993); 9
CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 250, at 55 (explaining that next increase in 1993 bill
was calculated to last until 1995-which in fact was the next time an increase was needed);
52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 204, at 2-25 (describing passage of next debt limit
increase in March 1996 (heldover from 1995 budget battle), calculated to cover the gov-
ernment's borrowing needs through October 1997); 53 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note
204, at 2-53 (describing 1997 passage of next bill debt limit increase, expected to last until
December 15, 1997).
2 See, e.g., 6 CONG. AND THE NATION, supra note 122, at 43 (describing passage of
debt limit increase in 1983 "hours" before November adjournment and in 1984 in face of
October adjournment); Economics & Finance: Major Legislative Actions of the 101st Con-
gress, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2648 (1990) (discussing passage of a temporary increase
by members "eager to leave town for the August recess" in 1990); Elizabeth Wehr, Recess
Rush Slowed By Debt-Limit Measure, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1788 (1987) (reporting pas-
sage of a temporary increase prior to August recess); Janet Hook, Hard-Fought Battles
Mark Key Votes in 1986, 44 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2755, 2755-59 (1986) (describing pas-
sage of short-term bills in time for Labor Day and October adjournments in 1986).
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meaning of these numbers by, for instance, making statements such as,
"The nation needs to borrow X dollars to keep the Department of Educa-
tion operating at existing levels"; "We need to borrow Y dollars to pay for
military spending/war"; or "We need to borrow Z dollars to fund health en-
titlements at the current level because the population eligible is expected
to rise." Such required explanations would restore some of the defined
connection between congressional borrowing and its purpose that used to
exist when Congress specifically authorized each issuance of government
debt.
In this vein, the debt limit statute also could be amended to require
that legislation increasing the debt ceiling contain a summary explaining
the projected national debt for the next five years, assuming continued
spending at the current levels. The Treasury Department currently pro-
vides Congress with five-year projections for different categories of debt,
but not in connection with debt limit increases, and Congress does not
share this information with the public.254 Requiring Congress to include
such projections as part of the debt limit increase, it is hoped, would in-
spire greater congressional deliberation about government borrowing and
the size of the national debt and possibly encourage proposals for reform
aimed at debt reduction.
CONCLUSION
None of these reform proposals can force Congress to stop running
budget deficits or even to make significant efforts to pay down the debt.
But the goal of these proposals is to use the existing structural framework
of the debt limit statute to make Congress focus more on-and share more
with the public regarding-the debt consequences of its spending and taxing
choices, rather than allow Congress to hide from these issues as it has
sought to do for many of the past thirty years.
2 4See 31 U.S.C. § 3130 (2000) ("Annual Public Debt Report").
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